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Chapter 1
1.1. Aims.
The aims of this thesis can be summed up as follows: to outline some of Davidson’s 
arguments against empiricism, and some o f his arguments fo r  a non-empiricist 
alternative. The arguments against empiricism are those attacking what Davidson 
calls the third and final dogma o f empiricism. These arguments are given in “On the 
Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme” (henceforth OVICS). The arguments for an 
alternative to empiricism are taken from “A Coherence Theory of Truth and 
Knowledge”.
In more detail the aims are as follows. Firstly, I intend to explain in some 
detail what the third dogma o f empiricism is. Secondly, I hope to give a clear and 
close reading of Davidson’s arguments attacking the dogma, as presented in OVICS. 
As I read these arguments they in no way presuppose any of Davidson’s theses 
concerning Radical Interpretation and the Principle o f Charity. His arguments in “A 
Coherence Theory o f Truth and Knowledge”, on the other hand, clearly do presuppose 
such theses. My third aim is to present the arguments in “A Coherence Theory” as 
defending an alternative to the empiricism rejected in OVICS, and thus illustrating 
that the stand-alone arguments against the third dogma compliment the arguments 
from Radical Interpretation offering an alternative to dogmatic empiricism. My final 
aim, however, is not so supportive of Davidson’s project as the others. In chapter 3 I 
will present a problem for Davidson’s arguments in “A Coherence Theory o f Truth 
and Knowledge”, and so suggest that his alternative to empiricism is no better off than 
the empiricism he attacks in OVICS.
1.2. A Roadmap.
In this section I will outline how I attempt to meet the aims set in 1.1. This outline 
will proceed chapter by chapter, and highlight where each aim is supposed to be 
achieved.
Section 1.3 will go some way to meeting my first aim— i.e. to explain what 
exactly the third dogma o f empiricism is. In OVICS and “A Coherence Theory of 
Truth and Knowledge” Davidson’s primary target is Quinean empiricism. In 1.3 I try 
to get clear what sort o f empiricism Quine holds, and thus what type o f empiricism
Davidson is attacking. To do so, I first explore how Quine’s empiricism developed as 
a reaction to the empiricism of the Logical Positivists. Then I discuss Quine’s 
empiricism in more detail. And finally, I explain what part of Quine’s empiricism 
Davidson finds dogmatic.
Chapter 2 is primarily concerned with aims two and tliree. Aim two was to 
give a clear and close reading of Davidson’s arguments against the third dogma of 
empiricism. As I said in 1.1, my reading of OVICS shows that these arguments in no 
way presuppose any of Davidson’s arguments for Radical Interpretation and the 
Principle of Charity. Rather Davidson argues that there is a contradiction inlierent in 
the scheme-content dualism (which by this point will have been shown to be the third 
dogma o f empiricism (1.3)). Davidson examines and rejects both Kuhnian and 
Quinean attempts to overcome this contradiction, arguing that both fail. He concludes 
that since this contradiction cannot be overcome, the scheme-content dualism is 
unintelligible, and should be rejected as a dogma o f empiricism.
In presenting these arguments as independent of Radical Interpretation, the 
first o f two steps has been talcen in achieving my third aim—that is, to demonstrate 
that Davidson’s arguments against the third dogma are stand-alone arguments that 
support his arguments from Radical Interpretation for an alternative to empiricism. 
The second step in achieving this aim is to be carried out in chapter 3.
In chapter 3 ,1 present Davidson’s alternative to what he now considers to be a 
defunct empiricism. This alternative takes the form of a coherence theory of 
knowledge which is supported by arguments from Radical Interpretation. In 
presenting this alternative, it will be cleai' that it is consistent with (and perhaps even 
motivated by) Davidson’s attack on empiricism in OVICS.
The final sections of chapter 3 (3.3-3.4) will see my fourth and final aim come 
to fruition, and will bring the thesis to a close. In these sections I will present a 
problem for Davidson’s alternative. I will argue that while the Principle o f Charity 
may make unintelligible the possibility of someone having mostly false beliefs, it does 
so illegitimately, and thus Davidson does not (in “A Coherence Theory o f Truth and 
Knowledge” at least) have a response to global scepticism— i.e. to the possibility that 
most o f our beliefs might be false.
Now we may return to my first aim—to explain what exactly the third dogma 
o f empiricism is. This is the purpose o f the next section.
1.3. The Dogmas of Empiricism.
Logical Analysis.
The members o f the Vienna Circle admired the cleai' and progressive methodologies 
applied in the empirical sciences. Contemporaiy philosophical methods pleased them 
rather less. The contemporary philosophical scene was dominated by neo-Kantian 
idealism. While Kant him self had rejected the possibility o f a supersensible 
metaphysics, those who followed him were rather more optimistic o f the prospects of 
such a discipline. In severing metaphysics and science, Kant had convinced others 
that there were new insights to be gained from metaphysics as an independent and 
self-regulated subject.^
The resultant plethora o f metaphysical systems, and the lack of any common 
standards on which to adjudicate between competing metaphysical claims contrasted 
sharply for the Positivists with the state o f the empirical sciences at the time. While 
metaphysicians seemed incapable o f agreeing on method, subject-matter, or criteria of 
success, scientists had shared standards for assessing the merits of alternative systems. 
O f course, they still disagreed among themselves over numerous issues, but these 
disagreements were constructive because of agreement on general issues of 
methodology. Since metaphysicians often disagreed on such issues, it seemed that 
they spent much o f their time talking past one another.^
The Positivists were desirous o f a new philosophical method— one that 
avoided the extravagances of neo-Kantian metaphysics, one with certain ‘scientific’ 
qualities. Scientific problems could be clearly formulated in a way acceptable to most 
scientists, and there was a relatively fixed set of criteria for what was to count as a 
solution to any particular problem. Philosophy, as the Positivists viewed it, sorely 
lacked such virtues, and so they attempted to develop a philosophical methodology of 
comparable merit.
They found suggestive examples in the work o f Ernst Mach and Henri 
Poincaré. However, even more influential was the ‘logical atomism’ o f Bertrand 
Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein. In the work o f these two philosophers the 
Positivists found the method of ‘logical analysis’, which they embraced and attempted 
to develop in line with their empiricism.^
'Rom anos, Quine and Analytic Philosophy, pp. 5-11.
^Schlick, “The Turning Point in Philosophy”, p. 57, and Carnap, “The Elimination o f Metaphysics 
Through the Logical Analysis o f Language”, pp. 61, 65-7, 69-72, 76-7.
^See Russell, “The Philosophy o f Logical Atomism”, and “Logical Atomism”, and W ittgenstein, 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
Both Russell and Wittgenstein insisted that the investigation o f logic should be 
central to philosophical work."' Moreover, Russell believed that logic had always 
been central to philosophy, even though many philosophers were unaware o f its 
influence. He suggests, for example, that the subject-predicate form embraced by 
logicians since Aristotle had, in part at least, influenced the trend in Western 
metaphysics to distinguish between substance and attribute.^ In becoming aware of 
this influence, along with developing a new logic (that o f Peano and Frege), a new 
method o f philosophy was born, the method of logical analysis.^ This is the method 
embraced by Russell in his work on philosophy o f mathematics (especially in 
Principia Mathematicd) and elsewhere, and by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus Logico- 
Philosophicus, and it is this method that so impressed the Positivists.
The method o f logical analysis was first to make philosophers aware of how 
one might be tricked by language into making fallacious inferences. Following on 
from this, logical analysis was to suggest how we might improve our language in 
order to avoid such mistakes altogether. Attempting to improve our logic, with the 
end goal of using it as a basis for an ideal language, not only aids us in making correct 
inferences, but can also aid us in learning something of the structure o f the world. 
Russell believed that logic may not only add certainty to om  philosophical theories by 
ensuring that they are formally correct, but also that investigation o f logic could itself 
yield philosophical knowledge. The idea was that a ideally logical language must in 
some ways mirror the world— more specifically, that the logical structure o f this 
language would mirror the structure o f the world."^ Wittgenstein embraced this 
method, and uses it to develop a metaphysics o f ‘facts’, ‘states o f affairs’, and 
‘objects’ in the first two sections of the Tractatus.^
There was much in this method of logical analysis that appealed to the 
Positivists. Firstly, the investigation of logical form, as demonstrated in the work on 
mathematics by Frege, Russell and Whitehead, had the ‘scientific’ qualities the 
Positivists admired.^ Vague musing on the “validity and limits of human knowledge 
... are replaced by considerations regarding the nature of expression, of 
representation, i.e. concerning every possible ‘language’ in the most general sense of 
the term.” There was much agreement on the method and subject matter o f these 
considerations. And, most importantly, “[wjherever there is a meaningful 
[philosophical] problem one can in theory always give the path that leads to its
^Russell, “Logical Atomism”, p .3 1, 45, 47. See also, “The Philosophy o f Logical Atomism”, pp. 178- 
82, and Schlick, op. cit., pp. 55-6.
^Russell, “Logical Atomism”, pp. 32, 38.
^See Schlick, op. cit., p. 55.
^Russell, op. cit., pp. 33, 38.
^Wittgenstein, op. cit., §§. 1-2.225.
^Russell, op. cit., p. 32.
solution” . O f course, as in the sciences, “[t]he practical following out o f this path 
may ... be hindered by factual circumstances”, but for any properly philosophical 
problem, solution was possible."'
Secondly, the method o f logical analysis encouraged close links between 
philosophy and the sciences.
It seems to me that science has a much greater likelihood o f being true in the main than any philosophy 
hitherto advanced (I do not, o f course, except my own). In science there are many matters about which 
people are agreed; in philosophy there are none. Therefore, although each proposition in a science may 
be false, and it is practically certain that there are some that are false, yet we shall be wise to build our 
philosophy upon science, because the risk o f  error in philosophy is pretty sure to be greater than in 
science. If  we could hope for certainty in philosophy the matter would be otherwise, but so far as I can 
see such a hope would be chimerical.
(Russell, “Logical Atomism”, p. 46.)
So, logical analysis may serve as a philosophical method that takes science as its 
subject-matter. Epistemology then becomes science, and philosophy becomes the 
investigation o f the meaning o f scientific terms, and the form of scientific language.* *
Finally, the lack o f certainty in philosophy as an autonomous mode of inquiry, 
expressed in the Russell quote above, was a view that the Positivists had much 
sympathy for. They would have approved of Russell’s claim that “certainty in 
metaphysics seems to me unattainable”, even through the application o f his new 
method. *2 The Positivists were fiercely anti-metaphysical, and the fact that logical 
analysis did not bring with it any metaphysical baggage was definitely an advantage in 
their eyes.
Logical Positivism.
Encouraged by the work o f Russell and Wittgenstein, the Positivists embraced the 
method o f logical analysis, and made it their own. To demonstrate how this method 
was applied by the Positivists, in this section I will discuss a representative example, 
from the heyday o f the Vienna Circle. The example I have chosen is that of Carnap, 
as presented in his “The Elimination of Metaphysics Tlu'ough Logical Analysis of 
Language”, first published in 1932.*^
"'Schlick, op. cit., pp. 55-6
* *For the Positivists’ endorsement o f this approach see, for example, Schlick, op. cit., pp. 56-7. 
'^Russell, op. cit., p. 50. See also, “The Philosophy o f Logical Atomism”, pp. 269-81. 
'^Originally published as “Oberwindung der Metaphysik durch Logische Analyse der Sprache”-, in 
Erkenntnis, Vol. II, 1932. Translated by Arthur Pap in Ayer (ed.). Logical Positivism, pp. 60-81.
Like Russell and Wittgenstein before him, Carnap investigates logical form in 
order to gain philosophical insight. He begins by considering what logical or formal 
characteristics a language must have for it to be meaningful. Once these have been 
determined, he then draws out some of their philosophical implications. The logical 
characteristics a meaningful language must possess are summed up by the rules of 
logical syntax. According to Carnap, investigation of logical syntax (i.e. logical 
analysis) will give insights into various philosophical issues— e.g. concerning 
meaning, verification, the methodology o f the sciences, and the possibility o f non- 
empirical knowledge. In what follows, I will first detail Carnap’s views on logical 
syntax, and then discuss the resultant philosophical insights.
“A language”, Carnap tells us, “consists o f a vocabulary and a syntax, i.e. a set 
o f words which have meanings and rules of sentence formation.” *'* When we talk 
about the syntax o f a language, we are usually talking about its grammar. Camap, 
however, is not concerned with grammar but rather with the logical syntax of 
language. He wishes to investigate not what makes a sentence grammatically well 
formed, but logically well formed. Such an investigation is to give an understanding 
of what logical form a language must have in order for it to be meaningful.
A language is more than a mere vocabulary. If we pick words from such a 
vocabulary and put them together one after another followed by a fulLstop, we get a 
list and not a sentence. Only when words are combined in certain ways do they 
produce meaningful sentences. How words can be combined in order to produce 
sentences is stipulated by the syntax o f the language. These rules determine what 
form or structure a list o f words must have in order for it to be a meaningful sentence. 
Without the form imposed by syntax, there would be no la n g u a g e s .T h u s , they 
embody the formal conditions for languagehood. As I have said, for Carnap and the 
Logical Positivists, these formal conditions were of two basic types— grammatical 
and logical.
A sentence in language L, say s, in which the words are put together in 
accordance with the rules o f grammar for L is grammatically well formed. The rules 
usually tell us which (grammatical) types of words can go with which, and in what 
order. So, to determine whether the construction of s  is in accordance with these 
rules, one must know what the rules are, and also of what grammatical type the words 
in j  are.
Similar reasons make a sentence logically well formed. But now the syntax 
rules are not grammatical, but (unsurprisingly) logical. Just as putting subject, verb 
and conjunction together in ‘Caesar is and’ offends against the rules o f grammar (for
'"'Carnap, “The Elimination o f  Metaphysics Through the Logical Analysis o f Language”, p. 61, 
'^O r else there would be only one-word languages.
English), and so produces a meaningless sentence, putting ‘words’ of particular 
logical forms in the wrong order, e.g. singular term and disjunction in ‘Caesar or or’, 
offends against the rules of logical syntax (for propositional logic), and so produces a 
meaningless s e n te n c e . 'F o r  a sentence to have meaning, then, it must not only be 
grammatically but also logically well formed— i.e. it must be constructed by ordering 
words o f a certain logical form in the order stipulated by the rules o f logical syntax.
There is, however, a substantial difference between the two types o f syntax. 
While grammar is primarily concerned with the rules for the correct use and 
combination o f words, the rules of logical syntax are to be derived from study of the 
true subject o f logic, i.e. inference. (In his paper Carnap limits his discussion to 
deductive inference, and I will do likewise.) This being the case, the primary concern 
o f logical syntax is to stipulate rules o f inference, and then ensure that rules for 
sentence formation and the logical form of words cohere with the inference rules.
The rules o f logical syntax concerning inference are commonly referred to as 
logical laws. An example o f such a law is modus ponens— from the two true premises
(1) the conditional C and (2) the antecedent of C, the consequent o f C follows. In this 
particular example, the rule tells us what form o f conclusion follows from premises of 
a particular logical form. ‘Conditional’, ‘antecedent’, and ‘consequent’ are all terms 
for sentences o f a particular logical form, and the rules for the correct construction of 
sentences rest on rules of inference like modus ponens. A sentence, then, is logically 
well-formed if  it can feature in a logical inference, and the logical form o f a word is 
also determined by how it features in logical inference.
Thus we arrive at the essential logical characteristics a language must possess 
in order for it to be meaningful. For a sentence to be logically well-formed is for it to 
be able to feature in deductions as premise and/or conclusion. And so, the logical 
characteristic a language must possess for it to be meaningful is that all sentences 
formed in the language can feature in deductions. To ensure that this is the case, the 
laws for sentence formation (the laws o f logical syntax) must agree with, and derive 
from, the logical laws.'^ It follows that a word is only meaningful if  it can feature in 
sentences that feature in deductions. That is, it is only meaningful if  it has a certain 
logical form or type (e.g. if  it is a singular term, predicate, quantifier, etc.). And so 
we return to the initial truism that a language is made up of a vocabulary and a syntax. 
Now we have seen that for a language to be meaningful, all the words in its 
vocabulary must have a logical form or type, and the rules of syntax must be in accord
'^W lien speaking o f the logical form o f  words, I mean the logical form o f any logically significant sub- 
sentential term or phrase.
'^The sentence ‘Caesar or or’ is o f course grammatically, as well as logically, ill-formed.
' ^ The logical laws are then the most basic laws o f logical syntax.
with the logical laws and produce only sentences that may feature in logical 
deductions.
So, the ability of words and sentences to enter into deductive relations fixes 
their form, and so ensures that they are meaningful (in Carnap’s sense of the term'^). 
But logical syntax not only gives insight into meaningfulness. According to Carnap, 
what deductive relations words and sentences enter into also determines their 
m e a n i n g . 2 0  This is the first of the philosophical insights to be gained by investigation 
of logical syntax.
The process o f determining meaning by investigation of logical syntax is as 
follows. First, to ascertain the meaning of a word, we must first detemiine its logical 
form.
[T]he syntax o f the word must be fixed, i.e. the mode o f its occurrence in the simplest sentence form in 
which it is capable o f occurring; we call this sentence form its elementary sentence. The elementary 
sentence form for the word “stone” e.g. is “x is a stone” ; in sentences o f this form some designation 
from the category o f things occupies the place o f “x,” e.g. “this diamond,” “this apple.”
(Carnap, “The Elimination o f Metaphysics” , p. 62.)
Let S be the elementary sentence for a particular word a. Then the question 
‘what is the meaning o f S?’ is to be reformulated as ‘what sentences is S deducible 
from, and what sentences are deducible from S?’^' But how is this, a question about 
logical form, supposed to determine meaning? An example is in order.
Take the word ‘antliropode’. ‘Antliropode’ means ‘an animal with a 
segmented body and jointed legs’. Let the elementary sentence S for ‘antliropode’ be 
‘x is an anthiopode’. Now, the answer to the question ‘what sentences is S deducible 
from, and what sentences are deducible from S?’ is: S is deducible from the set o f 
premises ‘x is an animal’, ‘x has a segmented body’, and ‘x has jointed legs’, and each 
of these three premises are deducible from S. And so the connection between 
meaning and logical relation becomes cleai'. The meaning of a word is specified by a 
definition in terms of other words, or a ‘reduction’ to other words. The relation of the
'^Carnap makes a distinction between what he later calls ‘cognitive’ and ‘expressive’ meaning. He will 
not deny that some sentences that offend against logical syntax have meaning. For example, a poet may 
use a logically ill-formed sentence discussing an emotion, and this sentence will have meaning. This 
type o f meaning Carnap calls ‘expressive’ meaning, i.e. it expresses for example an “attitude” or an 
emotion. But it does not have any ‘cognitive’ meaning, i.e. it does not assert anything or describe a 
state o f affairs. The fact that the poet expresses rather than asserts will not worry her, for she does not 
intend her work to be taken as a deductive argument to a true conclusion. A philosopher, on the other 
hand, should intend her work to be taken this way, and so should be only concerned with cognitive 
meaning, and the logical form o f her language. And so the language o f the philosopher should be 
purged o f expressive meaning, and adhere to the rules o f logical syntax, ib id , pp. 78-81.
^^ibid., p. 62.
^L b id ,  p. 62.
word to its ‘reduction’ is a logical one— i.e. the word a is reducible to the words b i, 
\)2> ... bn if and only if  the elementary sentence for a is deducible from the set of 
elementary sentences for b i, b2 , ... bn and each o f the elementary sentences for bi, b2 , 
... bn are deducible from the elementary sentence for a.^^
Once the form and meaning o f the vocabulary of a language have been fixed, 
the meaning o f the sentences of that language will be easily establishable. Knowing 
the form and meaning o f the words that go to make up a sentence, and knowing the 
rules o f logical syntax in accordance with which the sentence has been constructed, 
we will be able to determine the meaning of the sentence. And just as words are 
logically reducible to other words, so sentences are logically reducible to other 
sentences. So, for example, if  I wish to know the meaning of
(1) This man is an antliropode.
I may carry out a logical reduction on the sentence, reducing it to
(2) This man is an animal with segmented body and jointed legs.
This reduction follows from the reduction of ‘antlnopode’ mentioned above. We may 
reduce the sentence further by determining how ‘this man’ could be reduced. That is, 
we could construct an elementary sentence for ‘this man’— i.e. ‘This man is F ’— and 
investigate how it enters into deductive inferences.
Carnap claims that all sentences are in this way reducible to other sentences. 
And, by this process o f reductionism, each sentence can be linlced to sentences that 
are, in some way, about experience (‘observation’ or ‘protocol’ sentences).
Therefore, the logical process o f reduction not only tells us what the meaning of a 
sentence is, but also what experiences would verify it. (Flence the Positivist slogan 
“The meaning o f a statement consists in its method of verification”.24) Thus we come 
to the second philosophical insight to be gained from investigation o f logical syntax. 
This time the investigation o f the logical syntax o f a language, L, will give us an 
insight into the method o f verification for sentences in L.
^^The example is taken from Carnap, ibid., p. 63.
^^The Positivists disagreed on how exactly these sentences are ‘about’ experience.
“In the theoiy o f knowledge it is customary to say that the primary sentences refer to ‘the given’; but 
there is no unanimity on the question what it is that is given. At times the position is taken that 
sentences about the given speak o f the simplest qualities o f  sense and feeling (e.g. ‘w arm ,’ ‘blue,’ ‘jo y ’ 
and so forth); others incline to the view that basic sentences refer to total experiences and similarities 
between them; a still different view has it that even the basic sentences speak o f things” , Carnap, ibid., 
p. 63. See Schlick “The Foundation o f Knowledge” and Neurath, “Protocol Sentences” for a classic 
debate concerning these differences.
^"'Schlick, “Positivism and Realism”, pp. 86-95,
If all sentences in L can be reduced to observation sentences by logical 
analysis, and these observation sentences can be directly verified by experience, then 
we have a method for verifying all sentences in Z. To verify any paiticular sentence j  
in L, we simply investigate what observation sentences j  reduces to, and then check 
whether these observation sentences match our experience or not. The relation o f 
reduction is a logical one, i.e. it is fully determined by the logical syntax o f Z, and 
therefore the method of verification can be determined purely by logical investigation. 
O f course, once we know which observation sentences will serve to verify a particular 
sentence, an empirical investigation must be carried out in order to determine whether 
or not the observation sentences are supported by experience. But the fact remains 
that logical investigation will yield epistemological insights.
One such insight was that not all laiowledge need be justified by experience. 
While most meaningful sentences were reducible to observation sentences, there were 
meaningful sentences that were not. Such sentences, refen*ed to by Wittgenstein as 
‘tautologies’ and ‘contradictions’, are simply true or false in virtue o f their logical 
form.25 Thus they are true or false ‘come what may’ in experience.
Following later work by Quine, we may distinguish two types o f ‘tautologies’, 
or as they were called by the Positivists, ‘analytic’ sentences.26 First, there are logical 
truths. For example,
(1) No unmarried man is married.
Second, there are sentences which are true in virtue of their meaning. For example,
(2) No bachelor is married.
For Carnap and the Positivists, sentences of type (1) are true purely in virtue o f the 
rules o f logical syntax. (1) states that a man cannot be both married and unmarried. If 
the logical syntax of a language in which (1) is stated disallows such simultaneous 
attribution and non-attribution o f predicates to singular terms, then (1) is true in Z in 
virtue o f the mles of logical syntax for Z.
(2), as I have said, is taken by the Positivists to be true in virtue o f the meaning 
of ‘bachelor’ and ‘married’. Investigation of the meaning of ‘bachelor’ will show that 
it is reducible to the words ‘unmarried male’. Therefore, (2) is reducible to
(3) No umnarried male is married.
2^See, for example, Wittgenstein, op. cit., §§. 4.46-4.4661. “Propositions show what they say: 
tautologies and contradictions show that they say nothing” (4.461.).
^^Qiiine, “Two Dogmas o f Empiricism”, pp. 22-3.
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(3) is true in virtue of rules o f logical syntax, in the same way as (1). And if  (2) is 
logically reducible to (3), and (3) is true, then (2) is true. Like (1), (2) is true 
regardless o f what may come in experience, and which observation sentences are 
confirmed and disconfirmed by experience.
Since analytic sentences are true independently of the verification o f any 
particular observation sentences, they are said to have no ‘empirical content’. The 
sentences whose truth, on the other hand, do depend on certain observation sentences 
being confirmed do have empirical content. What this content is, i.e. what these 
sentences say about experience, is determined by what observation sentences they are 
reducible to. These sentences are called ‘synthetic’ sentences.
So, our sentences can be true in two ways. First, a sentence may be 
analytically true, and can be shown to be true by appeal to logical syntax itself.
Second, a sentence may be synthetically true, and can be shown to be so by first 
reducing it to observation sentences, and then demonstrating that these observation 
sentences are confirmed by experience. Thus there are two distinct methods of 
verification. A sentence can be verified (depending on whether it is an analytic or 
synthetic sentence) either by an appeal to logical syntax itself, or by reduction to 
observation sentences via logical analysis. Either way, the acquisition and testing of 
knowledge is governed by the rules o f logical syntax, and thus investigation o f these 
rules will yield epistemological insights.
In this section we have seen how investigation into logical form might produce 
philosophical understanding. The method o f logical analysis can firstly produce a 
better understanding o f the working of inference. This understand will facilitate the 
philosopher by making clear what a sound argument consists in, and how natural 
language can trick us into fallacious arguments. Secondly, it will give us insights into 
meaning. And finally, it can give us insights into how we can verify sentences, and 
hence help us understand how we acquire knowledge.
Logical Positivism and Empiricism.
The method o f logical analysis was to serve as a basis for a new empiricism. Like 
other empiricists before them, the Positivists gave verification a central role. Yet 
allowing for analytic truths enabled them also to account for the possibility o f a priori 
laiowledge (e.g. mathematical knowledge). But what was really new in this 
empiricism was that the relation between knowledge and experience was a logical 
one— that o f ‘reduction’ via the rules o f logical syntax.
The Positivists’ views on logical syntax implied that any sentence that was not 
verifiable, either by appeal to logical syntax itself or by appeal to experience via
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observation sentences, was meaningless. Therefore, the method o f logical analysis 
implied that statements not ultimately concerned with logical syntax or experience 
were meaningless. Because o f this, the Positivists argued that metaphysics was not a 
legitimate mode o f enquiry, since statements about the noumenal world were 
meaningless. Metaphysical problems were banished, and branded as ‘pseudo­
problems’. The same view was taken of ethics, since sentences about values and 
norms could be neither logically nor empirically verified.
Logical analysis, then, pronounces the verdict o f  meaninglessness on any alleged knowledge that 
pretends to reach above or behind experience. This verdict hits, in the first place, any speculative 
metaphysics, any alleged Icnowledge by pure thinking  or by pure intuition that pretends to be able to do 
without experience. ... Further, the same judgem ent must be passed on all philosophy o f  norms, or 
philosophy o f  value, on any ethics or esthetics as a normative discipline. For the objective validity o f a 
value or norm is ... not empirically verifiable nor deducible from empirical statements.
(Carnap, ’T h e  Elimination o f Metaphysics” , p. 77.)
With the emphasis on verification, then, epistemology comes to the fore. 
Verification itself was to be the concern of the experimental scientist, and the 
philosopher was to concern himself with the method of verification, by studying the 
logical syntax o f scientific and eveiyday language. The philosopher’s task was to 
ensure that the sciences did not offend against their rules of logical syntax, and to test 
the coherence and correctness of the rules themselves. And so we see as central 
concerns in the work o f the Logical Positivists issues like: the relation between logical 
syntax and scientific method; the articulation o f the logical syntax o f the various 
sciences; the ‘reduction’ o f scientific and/or everyday statements to observation 
statements; and the form and content o f observation statements themselves. 
Philosophy was then to become a rather more formal discipline that it had been 
immediately before the rise o f Logical Atomism and Logical Positivists. And it was 
hoped that the results of studying logical form would be rather more precise and more 
surely substantiated than those gleaning from metaphysical investigation. These 
hopes were, however, somewhat ill-founded.
Two Dogmas o f  Empiricism.
In “Two Dogmas o f Empiricism” '^'', W. V. O. Quine carries out a two pronged attack 
on logical empiricism. The first prong comes in sections 1 to 4 of the paper, and
^^First published in Philosophical Review, January, 1951. Page numbers here refer to the reprint in 
From a Logical Point o f  View, pp. 20-46.
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culminates in a rejection o f the analytic-synthetic distinction. Here Quine grants that 
given “[i]t is obvious that truth in general depends on both language and 
extralinguistic fact”, it is tempting to suppose “in general that the truth of a statement 
is somehow analyzable into a linguistic component and a factual component.” And, 
“[gjiven this supposition, it next seems reasonable that in some statements the factual 
component should be null; and these ai'e the analytic statements.”^^  However, he 
attempts to argue that
for all its a priori reasonableness, a boundary between analytic and synthetic statements simply has not 
been drawn. That there is such a distinction to be drawn at all is an unempirical dogma o f  empiricists, a 
metaphysical article o f faith.
(Quine, “Two Dogmas” , p. 37.)
Quine begins his argument by making a distinction between two types of 
analytic sentence. Firstly there are logical truths, like
(1) No unmarried man is married
The relevant feature o f this example is that it not merely is true as it stands, but remains true under any 
and all reinterpretations o f ‘man’ and ‘m arried’. If  we suppose a prior inventory o f logical particles, 
comprising ‘no’, ‘un-’, ‘not’, ‘i f ,  ‘then’, ‘and’, etc., then in general a logical truth is a statement which 
is true and remains true under all reinterpretations o f its components other than the logical particles.
(Quine, “Two Dogmas”, pp. 22-3.)
Secondly, there are statements like
(2) No bachelor is married.
The characteristic o f  such a statement is that it can be turned into a logical truth by putting synonyms 
for synonyms; thus (2) can be turned into (I)  by putting ‘unmarried man’ for its synonym ‘bachelor’.
(Quine, “Two Dogmas”, p. 23.)
(1) is true purely in virtue o f its logical form or structure. (2) is true because it can be 
converted into a logical truth (i.e. (1)) by replacing a word with a synonymous word.
In his attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction Quine is prepared to grant that there 
are such things as ‘logical truths’. His argument is against the claim that sentences 
like (2) are analytically true. The problem with the explanation of the analyticity of
^^ib id , p. 36.
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(2) is that it rests on an understanding o f synonymy, which Quine insists is as much in 
need o f explanation as analyticity itself. In support of this claim he explores various 
attempts to explain synonymy—i.e. definition, interchangability salva veritate, and an 
appeal to semantical rules.
Quine disposes o f each o f the purported explanations of synonymy as follows. 
Definition, he argues, presupposes rather than explains s y n o n y m y . F o r  purely 
extensional languages interchangability salva veritate will not guarantee synonymy.
In such a language sameness o f extension results in interchangability salva veritate, 
but it does not guarantee sameness o f meaning (i.e. synonymy). For example, 
‘creature with a kidney’ and ‘creature with a heart’ have the same extension, but it is 
clear that they are not synonymous. Things are no better for an intensional language, 
because intension (like definition) presupposes rather than explains synonymy. 
Finally, Quine turns his attention to the idea that
the difficulty in separating analytic statements fi'om synthetic ones in ordinary language is due to the 
vagueness o f ordinary language and that the distinction is clear when we have a precise artificial 
language with explicit “semantical rules” .
(Quine, “Two Dogmas”, p. 32.)
Such semantical rules may take various forms, but none of these will justify the 
analytic-synthetic distinction. Firstly,
[l]et us suppose ... an artificial language Lq whose semantical rules have the form explicitly o f a 
specification ... o f  all the analytic statements in Lq. The rules tell us that such and such statements, and 
only those, are the analytic statements o f L q. N o w  here the difficulty is simply that the rules contain the 
word ‘analytic’, which we do not understand! We understand what expressions the rules attribute 
analyticity to, but we do not understand what the rules attribute to those expressions.
(Quine, “Two Dogmas”, p. 33.)
Alternatively, we may view these semantical rules as defining a new simple symbol 
‘analytic-for-To’. But on this approach the rules do not tell us anything about how the 
new symbol ‘analytic-for-To’ is to explain the term ‘analytic’.
Quine concludes that since we are unable precisely to define synonymy, we 
can no longer justify the claim that sentences like (2) are analytic. There are varying
opinions on how successful Quine’s attack on analyticity actually is. Some insist that
2 9 /W .,p p . 24-7. 
pp. 27-32.
^^ibid., p. 33.
even if  there is a circle between analyticity, synonymy and meaning, this does not 
necessarily undermine its i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y . ^ ^
Yet even if  we grant that Quine’s arguments in sections 1- 4 are correct, we 
have already seen that the analytic-synthetic distinction can still be explained by an 
appeal to reductionism. Quine is well aware of this, and so sets out in section 5 of 
“Two Dogmas” to demonstrate that reductionism itself is another dogma of 
empiricism. This is the second prong of Quine’s attack on logical empiricism, where 
the method o f reduction itself comes under attack.
The Positivists have told us that the meaning of a sentence s is to be 
determined by investigation of the method of verifying j. Investigation o f the method 
o f verification consists of reducing j  to a set o f observation or protocol sentences. 
Sentence r can be said to be synonymous with s if  it reduces to the same observation 
or protocol sentences— i.e. if its method o f verification is the same as j-. Once 
synonymy has been thus determined, then analyticity can be explained in terms of 
synonymy and logical truth.
Quine begins his attack on this explication of analyticity by asking
[j]ust what are these methods which are to be compared for likeness? What, in other words, is the 
nature o f the relation between statement and the experiences which contribute to or detract from it 
confirmation.
(Quine, “Two Dogmas”, p. 38.)
Early in the movement, the Logical Positivists saw the relation as follows. Sentence j  
could be logically reduced to a set of protocol sentences. These protocol sentences are 
about private sense data. And so the relation between statement and experience is one 
o f ‘radical reduction’. Any meaningful statement could be fully reduced to 
incorrigible statements about private sense data. But by the time Quine wrote “Two 
Dogmas” (1951) this radical reductionism had been left behind. However, Quine 
insists,
the dogma o f reductionism has, in subtler and more tenuous form, continued to influence the thought o f 
empiricists. The notion lingers that to each statement, or each synthetic statement, there is associated a 
unique range o f possible sensory events such that the occurrence o f any o f them would add to the 
likelihood o f truth o f the statement, and that there is associated also another unique range o f  possible 
sensory events whose occurrence would detract h om that likelihood. This notion is o f  course implicit 
in the verification theory o f meaning.
^^See Miller, Philosophy o f  Language, pp. 120-3, and Grice and Strawson, “ In Defence o f  a Dogma”, 
pp. 149-53.
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The dogma o f reductionism survives in the supposition that each statement, taken in isolation 
from its fellows, can admit o f confimiation or infirmation at all.
(Quine, “Two Dogmas”, pp. 40-1.)
Quine’s denies that such confirming (or infirming) experiences can be 
associated with single statements, taken in isolation from the theory that contain them. 
Instead, he argues for what is now commonly loiown as the ‘Duhem-Quine Thesis’. 
The essential claim is that
our statements about the external world face the tribunal o f sense experience not individually but only 
as a corporate body.
(Quine, “Two Dogmas”, p. 41.)
Duhem argued that there was no such thing as a crucial experiment in physics. He 
claimed that testing a particular hypothesis by experiment involved presupposing the 
truth o f many other statements— e.g., about instruments, measurement, physical laws 
etc. So, a single statement can only ‘face the tribunal of experience’ as a member o f a 
set of statements, and not on its own.^3
Quine expands on the argument in “Two Dogmas”. He argues that all 
attempts to verify a single statement by appeal to experience would be undermined by 
the fact that judgements about recalcitrance cannot be made for any particular 
statement in isolation from the theoiy (set of statements) it comes from. There 
follows a reconstruction o f Quine’s argument.
Let it be the case that I hold a tlieory T  with a logic L, Say I derive the 
statement I  -> P from T  via L, where /  is to stand for certain initial observable 
conditions, and P for a further obseiwable event. That is, I derive a prediction from 
my theory—  I P  predicts that if  I  occurs, then P must also occur. To test if  this 
statement is verified by my sense experiences I set up an experiment in which the 
conditions I  are brought about. If  P  follows, then the statement is confirmed, and if P 
does not follow, it is infirmed. In other words, if P  follows, my sense experience 
elicits from me the observational response I  -> P, and if  not then my sense experience 
elicits from me the observational response /  & -iP.
Quine argues, however, that if  the latter occurs (i.e. if I assent to 7 & -nP) this 
does not necessarily bring about the infirmation o f 7 P. Rather, it is unclear what 
the sense experience might infirm. There are various options open to me. Since 7 
P  was derived from T  via L, I could blame the recalcitrance on any o f the P-statements
See Duhem, The Aim  and Structure o f  Physical Theory.
The reconstruction closely follows Crispin W right’s presentation, in his “Inventing Logical 
Necessity” , o f  Quine’s arguments.
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from which I  —> P  followed. Or I could blame the recalcitrance on any o f the laws of 
L used to derive 1 -> P from T-premises.
So, while Quine allows that we can arrive at observation sentences (like I  ->
P) by logical deduction, he insists that this process does not link particular 
experiences to particular statements for purposes of conformation.^^ hi the very act of 
comparing statement and experience we must invoke other subsidiary statements, and 
so a ‘one-to-one’ link cannot be forged.^*^
If this is the case, then the Positivists cannot depend on the claim that 
empirical content can be allocated statement by statement. Thus, the method of 
verification becomes confused, since there is no clear relation between particular 
statements and particular sense experiences. While observation statements can be 
logically deduced from theories, no particular statement can be reduced to a particular 
observation statements, and so confirmation cannot proceed statement by statement. 
Rather, we have some sort o f confirmation holism, in which the unit o f empirical 
significance is no longer the statement, but rather “the whole o f science”—  i.e., all the 
statements o f our theory taken as a corporate whole.^? Endorsing this holism, we 
embark on what Quine calls an “empiricism without the dogmas” .^ ^
Once this confirmation holism is accepted
it becomes folly to seek a boundary between synthetic statements, which hold contingently on 
experience, and analytic statements, which hold come what may. Any statement can be held true come 
what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system. ... Conversely, by the same 
token, no statement is immune to revision.
(Quine, “Two Dogmas”, p. 43.)
To summarise then, reductionism will not make sense of analyticity construed 
as logical truth plus synonymy. Reductionism was supposed to serve as a method for 
identifying synonymous words and statements. Two statements would be 
synonymous if  they were verified in the same way (i.e. reducible to the same 
observation sentences). Two words would be synonymous if they affected in the same 
way the method o f verification for the statements that contained them. However, 
according to Quine, an isolated statement camiot be reduced to a set o f observation 
statements. Rather, it is only in the context o f a theory or set o f statements that 
observation sentences can be deduced. And since the production o f observation 
sentences depends on a set of statements, it is possible to revise any one o f these
Quine, op. cit., p. 43. 
ibid., pp. 42-3. 
ibid., p. 42. 
ibid., p. 42.
17
statements on the occurrence of recalcitrance. Experience, on its own, does not 
determine whether a particular statement is confirmed or infirmed.
The totality o f our knowledge or beliefs ... is so underdetermined by its boundary conditions, 
experience, that there is much latitude o f choice as to what statements to reevaluate in the light o f any 
single contrary experience. No particular experiences are linked with any particular statements in the 
interior o f  the field, except indirectly through considerations o f equilibrium affecting the field as a 
whole.
(Quine, “Two Dogmas”, pp. 42-3.)
“Empiricism without the Dogmas.
In section 6 o f “Two Dogmas” Quine offers an alternative to an empiricism based on 
the dogma of reductionism. As we have seen, the method of reductionism fixed the 
relation between statements and experience. There might be disagreements on what 
evidence for a statement’s truth actually consisted in (private sense data or publicly 
observable objects— cf. the famous debate between Neurath and Schlick^O). 
Nonetheless, reductionism could still associate “a unique range o f sensory events such 
that the occurrence of any of them would add to the likelihood o f the truth o f a 
[particulai'] statement”. I n  this way, reductionism makes clear what is to serve as 
empirical evidence for or against a statement.
But Quine has told us that “it is misleading to speak of empirical content of an 
individual statement”, and so he will not associate experiences with statements in this 
way."^  ^ Yet he does not have to reject the notion of empirical content altogether. 
Following the Duhem-Quine thesis, he must treat the “whole of science” as the “unit 
of empirical significance”.'^  ^ Once this rule is observed, empirical content may be 
allocated to statements— but only in the context of their place in “the whole of 
science”.
According to Quine
total science is like a field o f force whose boundaiy conditions are experience. A conflict with 
experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in the interior o f the field. Truth values have to be 
redistributed over some o f our statements. Réévaluation o f some statements entails réévaluation o f 
others, because o f  their logical interconnections— the logical laws being in turn simply certain further
^^ib id , pp. 42-6.
‘^ *^See Neurath, “Protocol Sentences” and Schlick, “The Foundation o f Knowledge” . 
^Ubid., p. 40.
‘^ ^ibid., p. 43.
‘^ ^ibid., p. 42.
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statements o f the system, certain further elements o f the field. Having reëvaluated one statement we 
must reevaluate some others, which may be statements o f  logical connections themselves.
(Quine, “Two Dogmas”, p. 42.)
So, all statements in the field are related via logical connections. Certain statements 
(observation sentences) stand at the edge o f the field, and it is these that ‘conflicf 
with experience. Once such a statement conflicts with experience, it would seem that 
it must be rejected. Doing so will have a laiock-on effect inside the field on 
statements that are logically connected to this infirmed observation sentence. This 
Imock-on effect may even alter the logical laws that govern the interconnections 
between statements within the field.
However, as Quine has pointed out against the reductionist, there is more than 
one option for how this re-evaluation could go. As a result, “[n]o particular 
experiences ai^ e linked with any particular statements in the interior o f the field, except 
indirectly tlmough considerations o f equilibrium affecting the field as a wliole.”"^"^ 
Instead there are various options as to what form the ‘knock-on’ effect takes. That is, 
a recalcitrant experience can be viewed as infirming any one of a number of 
statements. Which of these options is endorsed will determine how empirical content 
is to be distributed across the field o f force that is our scientific theory. We are to 
decide between these various options by appealing to pragmatic considerations 
concerning conservation, simplicity, and further r e c a l c i t r a n c e . ^ ^
The reader may have worried that Quine is supposing that the empirical 
content o f observation sentences can be determined independently o f the system that 
contained them— since it appears that the ability to determine whether they contradict 
experience is necessary for us to be able to distribute empirical content across the 
theory. However, it is our pragmatic considerations that are to determine which 
statements are to stand at the ‘edge’, and serve as observation sentences. These 
statements “though about physical objects and not sense experience, seem particularly 
germane to sense experience— and in a selective way: some statements to some 
experiences, others to others.” *^^
[I]n this relation o f “germaneness” I envisage nothing more than a loose association reflecting the 
relative likelihood, in practice, o f our choosing one statement rather than another for revision in the 
event o f  recalcitrant experience.
(Quine, “Two Dogmas”, p. 43)
^"^Quine, op. cit., p. 43.
pp. 42-3,46. 
‘^ ^ibid., p. 43.
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So, observation sentences are said to have the empirical content they have because of 
the relative likelihood of their rejection, and not vice versa. Theoretical statements, 
on the other hand, “may be thought o f as relatively centrally located within the total 
network; meaning merely that little preferential connection with any particular sense 
data obtrudes i t s e l f A n d  also meaning that they are relatively unlikely candidates 
for revision.
Within this hierarchical system, “ [pjhysical objects are conceptually imported 
... as convenient intermediaries— not by definition in terms o f experience, but simply 
as irreducible posits comparable, epistemologically, to the gods of Homer. ”48 The 
positing o f physical objects then serves as “a device for working a manageable 
structure into the flux of experience.”49 And, according to Quine, the positing does 
not stop with physical objects. He cites as other examples forces (like gravity) and the 
irrational numbers. Indeed, the only limiting factor on what can be posited to aid us in 
bringing structure to the “flux o f experience” is that “ [tjhe edge o f the system 
[including our posited entities] must be kept squared with experience; the rest, with 
all its elaborate myths and fictions, has as its objective the simplicity o f laws.”50
Theory, then, for Quine serves as a tool for ‘coping’ with experience. We may 
swell its ontology as we see fit, and as we find useful, as long as there is no clash with 
experience.51 We may distribute empirical content across theory as we see fit, as long 
as we ensure that (a) “the edge of the system” squares with experience, and (b) our 
chosen distribution serves well as a method for ‘coping’ with and predicting 
experience.
Epistemology Naturalized.
With Quine’s new view o f how theory and experience relate comes a new view of 
epistemology.
Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a chapter o f psychology and hence o f 
natural science. It studies a natural phenomena, viz. a physical human subject. This human subject is 
accorded a certain experimentally controlled input— certain patterns o f irradiation in assorted 
frequencies, for instance— and in the fullness o f time the subject delivers as output a description o f the 
three-dimensional external world and its history. The relation between the meager input and torrential 
output is a reiation that we are prompted to study for somewhat the same reasons that always prompted
4^/W ., p. 44. 
4S/7/'<7., p. 44. 
49/ô/t/., p. 44. 
^^ibid., p. 45. 
^Ubid., p. 45.
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epistemology; namely, in order to see how evidence relates to theory, and in what ways one’s theory o f 
nature transcends any available evidence.
(Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized”, pp. 82-3.)
The epistemologist is to investigate, then, how each man “warps his scientific heritage 
to fit his continuing sensory p r o m p t i n g s ” . Evidence relates to theory in the way we 
have already seen— i.e. it serves as a “boundary condition”. The epistemologist may 
study what we do within these conditions by “ [sjubtracting our [empirical] cues from 
our world view”, and thus uncovering our “net contribution to the difference”. “This 
difference marks the extent o f m an’s conceptual sovereignty—the domain within 
which he can revise theory while saving the data.”^^
As Quine says, the motivation for epistemology is the desire to discover how 
theory and evidence relate. With his rejection o f reductionism and his ‘naturalization’ 
o f epistemology, Quine has made a radical brealc from the Positivists regarding the 
relation between theory and evidence. For the Positivists, the relation was a logical 
one— i.e. the relation of reduction. Thus, logical analysis was to give great insights 
into how theory and evidence related, and how our beliefs were justified. Experience 
was to serve as the ultimate evidence, and the rules of logic were to determine the 
empirical content o f statements and theories, and thus determine their verification 
conditions.
Quine, on the other hand, insists that the relation between theory and evidence 
is a much looser one than that offered by the Positivists. Empirical content cannot be 
allocated statement by statements, and hence verification conditions are not fixed. 
Experience still serves as ultimate evidence, which theory must ‘fit’. But how exactly 
theory does ‘fit’ evidence is to be decided by pragmatic considerations. Indeed, even 
the logical rules associated with tlieoiy, which are used to derive empirical 
consequences from the theory, could be revised for pragmatic reasons. This 
possibility highlights the radical difference between Quine and the Positivists. No 
longer is the relation between theory and evidence (experience) fixed once and for all 
by the laws o f logic. Rather, the relation can take one of numerous forms, and the 
decision o f which form it takes is governed neither by logic nor by experience.
The Third Dogma.
Finally we come to our main topic— Davidson’s third dogma of empiricism. Like 
Quine before him, Davidson criticises contemporary accounts of empiricism because
^^ibid., p. 46.
^^Quine, W ord and Object, p. 5.
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of their commitment to an unintelligible dualism. This time the dualism is that of 
conceptual scheme and uninterpreted content. He argues that anyone who holds a 
broadly Quinean view o f how theory and evidence relate (see above) is committed to 
this dualism. As examples he cites Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, and Quine 
himself.
As we have seen, Quine claims that our theories impinge on experience “only 
along the e d g e s . ” ^ ^  w hat happens inside the web has as its objective only “the 
simplicity o f l a w s . C h a n g e s  in theory can involve changes and additions to 
ontology, and the only limit on these changes is that the theory serves as “a device for 
working a manageable structure into the flux o f experience.”^^  According to 
Davidson, such ontological commitment requires that we have concepts with which 
we can individuate the objects we have posited. Thus our conceptual scheme governs 
what structur e we work into the flux o f experience. And now we have what Davidson 
calls the third dogma of empiricism— the dualism of conceptual scheme and content.^? 
Conceptual scheme “organizes” or structures experience, and thus experience is 
“something waiting to be organized”.
I want to urge that this ... dualism o f scheme and content, o f organizing system and something waiting 
to be organized, cannot be made intelligible and defensible. It is itself a dogma o f empiricism, the third 
dogma. The third, and perhaps the last, for if  we give it up it is not clear that there is anything 
distinctive left to call empiricism.
(Davidson, OVICS, p. 189.)
In the chapter 2 we will see why Davidson believes that the scheme-content dualism 
“cannot be made intelligible and defensible” . In chapter 3 we will explore Davidson’s 
alternative to dogmatic empiricism.
^"^Quine, “Two Dogmas” , p. 42.
p. 43.
^^ib id , p. 43.
5?Davidson, OVICS, p. 189.
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Chapter 2
2.1. Introduction.
In this chapter I will outline Davidson’s arguments in OVICS for the claim that the 
scheme-content dualism is unintelligible and indefensible. The intention is to present 
Davidson’s arguments as clearly as possible, rather than to offer a detailed defence of 
them. In explaining the arguments, however, it has been necessary to expand on their 
presentation in OVICS. Section 2.2 presents what I have called ‘Davidson’s 
Paradox’. This paradox, according to Davidson, undermines the intelligibility of 
conceptual relativism.
The dominant metaphor o f conceptual relativism, that o f  differing points o f view, seems to betray an 
underlying paradox. Different points o f view make sense, but only if there is a common co-ordinate 
system on which to plot them; yet the existence o f a common system belies the claim of dramatic 
incomparability.
(Davidson, OVICS, p. 184.)
Davidson also argues that since endorsing the scheme-content dualism implies a 
commitment to conceptual relativism, the paradox will in fact undermine the very idea 
of a conceptual scheme.
In 2 .2 1 examine first the claim that the scheme-content dualism implies a 
commitment to conceptual relativism. Following this, I examine the paradox in 
detail, and following Davidson, unearth one possible solution. The rest o f the chapter 
discusses Davidson’s response to the proposed solution.
Section 2.3 explains how the notion of a non-translatable language may serve 
the schemer in constructing a solution to Davidson’s Paradox. Section 2.4 then sets 
out Davidson’s arguments against the possibility o f non-translatable languages, and 
thus against the schemer’s solution to the paradox.
Since this failed solution is the only one open to the schemer (as we shall see 
in 2.2), Davidson’s Paradox holds, and conceptual relativism is shown to be 
indefensible. And since all schemers must accept conceptual relativism, the scheme- 
content dualism itself is shown to be indefensible. Thus we cannot make intelligible 
the very idea o f a conceptual scheme.
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2.2. ‘Davidson’s Paradox.’
Conceptual schemes, we are told, are ways o f organizing experience; they are systems o f categories that 
give form to the data o f sensation; they are points o f view fi'om which individuals, cultures, or periods 
survey the passing scene. There may be no tianslating from one scheme to another, in which case the 
beliefs, desires, hopes, and bits of knowledge that characterize one person have no true counterparts for 
the subscriber to another scheme. Reality itself is relative to a scheme: what counts as real in one 
system may not in another.
(Davidson, OVICS, p. 184.)
This is Davidson’s target in OVICS. The above presentation picks out two essential 
aspects o f the scheme-content dualism. Firstly, what schemes essentially do is 
‘organize’, ‘give form’, or represent a ‘point of view’. All these metaphors suggest 
that if  there is one conceptual scheme, then there could be others— if  there is one way 
o f organising something, then there could be others; one way of giving form, then 
there could be others; one point o f view, then there could be others. Secondly, “there 
may be no translating from one scheme to another”, a chaiacteristic otherwise known 
as ‘incommensurability’ or ‘incomparability’.^
The method of attack is to show that these two aspects o f the scheme-content 
dualism are contradictory, and hence undermine the intelligibility o f the distinction 
itself. In the rest of this section two issues will be considered: (i) how these aspects 
contradict one another, and (ii) whether they really aie both essential implications of 
an endorsement of the scheme-content dualism.
D avidson‘s Paradox.
This section will outline how Davidson draws out a contradiction between the 
possibility o f alternative conceptual schemes and the fact that these alternative 
schemes are to be incommensurable. I have given his argument the title of 
‘Davidson’s Paradox’. Here is the paradox as presented by the man himself:
The dominant metaphor o f conceptual relativism, that o f differing points o f view, seems to betray an 
underlying paradox. Different points o f view make sense, but only if there is a common co-ordinate 
system on which to plot them; yet the existence o f a common system belies the claim o f dramatic 
incomparability.
(Davidson, OVICS, p. 184.)
* Davidson takes ‘non-translatable’ and ‘incommensurable’ as meaning the same thing— see OVICS, 
pp. 186-88, and especially p. 190.
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Spelling out the paradox will help us get clear about how it is to work.
Premises:
(1) There are different points o f view.
(2) If  (1), then there is a common system.
(3) Different points of view are dramatically incomparable.
(4) If a common system exists, then -i (3).
Conclusion:
(5) Therefore, there is a common system, AND there is not a common system.
(5) is a contradiction. It follows from the premises by applying modus ponens, modus 
tolens and conjunction introduction.^ Normally the next step in an argument that 
produces a paradox or contradiction is a reductio ad absurdum. This strategy, if used 
here, will have far reaching effect— i.e. it will undermine the scheme-content dualism 
itself. This is the desired effect as far as Davidson is concerned. However, it must be 
shown that all the premises embody essential characteristics of the scheme-content 
dualism, if  the reductio is to undermine the dualism. If we can still sanction such a 
dualism while rejecting one o f the premises, then the reductio will not dissolve the 
dualism, but merely destroy what is inessential to it. My next task, then, is to consider 
whether each premise is an essential implication of the scheme-content dualism.
Defending the Premises.
Our four premises are: (1) There are different points o f view; (2) If there are different 
points o f view, then there is a common system on which to ‘plot’ them; (3) Different 
points o f view are incomparable; (4) If there is a common system, then different 
points o f view are not incomparable. What is to be considered is whether any of these 
premises are inessential to an endorsement of the scheme-content dualism. It will be 
shown that premises (2) and (4) may be inessential. Therefore, premises (1) and (3)
^ Here is the full formal proof:
P: There are different points o f view; Q: There is a common system; R: Different points o f  view are 
incomparable.
1 (1 )P Ass.
2 ( 2 ) P - + Q Ass.
3 D ) R Ass.
4 (4) Q - ^ - ,R Ass.
1,2 (5)Q 1,2 Modus Ponens.
3,4 3,4 Modus Tolens.
1,2,3,4 ( 7 ) Q & - ,Q 5,6 & Introduction.
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will be dealt with first, in order to demonstrate that the relativist must accept them. 
Only then will our attention be turned on (2) and (4), and why they may not be 
essential tenets of conceptual relativism.
The first premise is the one that Davidson, in the end, wants to blame for the 
contradiction. It is granted to the relativist in order to bring about the reductio. This 
is the premise that is to be shown as leading to absurdity. It may be rephrased as 
‘there are different conceptual schemes’. Therefore it is obvious that this premise 
embodies an essential characteristic o f conceptual relativism— i.e. that there are 
alternative conceptual schemes. However, it does not immediately follow that 
someone endorsing the scheme-content dualism itself must accept this premise. For 
Davidson’s paradox to undermine the dualism itself, it must be shown that the 
scheme-content dualism implies conceptual relativism. We have already touched on 
this subject, but now it is time to deal with it in more detail.
It was suggested earlier that the scheme-content dualism implied conceptual 
relativism. The reason was that if  there was one way o f organising, viewing or putting 
form on content, then there might possibly be others. Support for this idea can be 
found in an argument that is derived from what seems to be a rather cryptic passing 
comment in OVICS. Davidson states that
[e]ven those thinlcers who are certain there is only one conceptual scheme are in the sway o f  the scheme 
concept; even monotheists have religion. And when someone sets out to describe ‘our conceptual 
schem e’, his homey task assumes, if  we take him literally, that there might be rival systems.
(Davidson, OVICS, p. 183.)
Taking first the claim that “monotheists have religion”. The point, presumably, is that 
whether you believe in one god or many, you aie obviously committed to the 
existence of some sort o f supernatural being(s) which stand in a certain relation to the 
natural world. Similarly, then, if  one is committed to a particular relation between 
scheme and content, then one is committed to the dualism of scheme and content. 
Initially this seems as uninteresting as it is uncontentious. First impression may, 
however, be mistaken. To demonstrate why, I turn now to the claim that describing 
one scheme assumes that there “might be rival systems”. It is unclear from the text 
what Davidson means by “might”. As a result there are at least two possible readings 
o f his claim here. Firstly, he could be read as claiming that if  one is committed to the 
scheme-content dualism, then one must grant the possible existence o f other 
schemes— i.e. one must grant that there might actually be other schemes.^ Secondly,
3The phi-ase “rival systems” supports this suggestion. Another system would not be a rival if it was 
only intelligible, rather than possible.
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he could be read as making the weaker claim that if  one is committed to the scheme- 
content dualism, then one must grant only the intelligibility o f the idea o f other 
schemes. That is, while one can deny that there is or ever could be an alternative 
conceptual scheme, one must at least find the notion o f an alternative conceptual 
scheme intelligible. So Davidson’s argument for the claim that even ‘mono- 
schemers’4 are committed to conceptual relativism is as follows.
(a) If one is committed to a particular relation between scheme and content, then one 
is committed to the scheme-content dualism.
(b) If  one is committed to the scheme-content dualism, then one is committed to the 
possibility/intelligibility o f alternative schemes.
(c) If one is committed to the possibility/intelligibility of alternative schemes, then 
one is committed to conceptual relativism.
However, it seems that neither reading o f this argument gives it any force.
The stronger reading is too strong to have any force against the mono-schemer. To 
counter the argument, she will simply insist that in view of the fact that her scheme is 
the only one, it is clear that she is in no way committed to the possible existence of 
other schemes. Rather, it seems that she must, if  she is to be consistent, deny the 
existence o f other schemes. And so, (c) does not follow. The weaker reading has a 
parallel difficulty, in that it is too M>eak to have any force against the mono-schemer. 
To counter the argument on its weaker reading, she can argue that even if  she does 
grant the intelligibility of other schemes, this in no way forces her to grant that there 
are or ever could be such schemes. There might have been other systems, but there 
are not. Again, (c) does not follow. So the mono-schemer is not committed to 
conceptual relativism— no matter how we are to interpret what Davidson means by 
“might”.
However, I believe that Davidson’s claim that endorsing the scheme-content 
dualism implies endorsing conceptual relativism may still be defended. With regards 
both readings o f Davidson’s argument, the mono-schemer’s defence depends on her 
certainty that her scheme is the only one. Davidson’s claim can be defended, then, by 
examining what evidence the mono-schemer could appeal to in order to justify her 
belief that there is only one scheme.
In her defence o f the claim that there is only one scheme, the mono-schemer 
must offer as evidence either some facet o f reality, some feature(s) o f the mind, and/or 
some characteristic(s) of language (or logic) that supports the thesis. But, as we saw 
in (a) above, a mono-schemer is committed to the scheme-content dualism. And all
'^That is, those who hold the view that there is only one conceptual scheme.
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those conuTiitted to the scheme-content dualism are committed to the view that 
[ijeality is lelative to a scheme Also (as we shall see in 2.3) all a schemer’s views 
o f mind and o f language are determined by the scheme they hold.^ Therefore, any 
argument offered by the mono-schemer in defence of her position which appeals to 
the world (‘reality’), the mind, or language will only reflect her own parochial point of 
view. If  her arguments are just relative to scheme, their conclusion will not hold 
absolutely. Theiefoie, she cannot justify absolutely the claim that her scheme is the 
only one. Her endorsement o f the scheme-content dualism commits her, whether she 
likes it or not, to the view that “there might be rival systems”. This ensures that not 
only conceptual relativists, but all those who endorse the scheme-content dualism, 
must accept premise (1). We can now move onto premise (3). (Premises (2) and (4) 
will prove more problematic for Davidson, and will be left till last.)
Premise (3) was that differing points o f view are incomparable. Conceptual 
relativism informs us that conceptual schemes may change across cultures or periods 
of time. As a result, we are told, it is sometimes impossible for someone who does 
not shaie the conceptual scheme o f a particular culture or period to understand the 
theoiies and general world view o f that culture or period. However, we do engage in 
investigation and interpretation o f the peoples o f many different cultures and 
periods— for example, via study in the academic subjects o f anthropology and history. 
So it seems counter-intuitive to say that we cannot understand these peoples, when 
many clearly thinlc that we can. However, incomparability (or incommensurability?) 
is a common doctiine o f conceptual relativism.^ The reason for this counter-intuitive 
commitment is, I argue below, that a failure to endorse the incommensurability of 
conceptual schemes undermines the explanatory force and philosophical interest of 
conceptual relativism. To demonstrate why, let us imagine that there were alternative 
conceptual schemes, but that they were comparable (by whatever method). Is there 
something offensive to the relativist in this thought experiment?
In this thought experiment alternative conceptual schemes can be 
‘reformulated’ into ours, so one cannot argue that what is essential to the difference o f 
world view across cultures and history is the presence of different conceptual 
schemes. Accepting comparability does not undermine the claim that there could be 
alternative conceptual schemes. However, it does undermine the claim that the 
tccisoyi these cultures are different is that they have a different conceptual scheme. If 
the conceptual relativist rejects premise (3), then she must reject the claim that talk of
^Davidson, OVICS, p. 183.
 ^See below pp. 35-9.
’ See, for example, Kuhn, The Structure o f  Scientific Revolutions, ch. X, and Feyerabend, 
“Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism”, section 7.
S For some 20“* century examples, see Davidson, op. cit., p. 184.
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alternative conceptual schemes is ultimately explanatory of examples of individual, 
cultural and historical diversity— alternative conceptual schemes might be a symptom 
of difference, but not a cause. So to retain the explanatory power, and the 
philosophical excitement, of conceptual relativism, the relativist must accept premise 
(3)9
So far, we have seen that the relativist is committed to premises (1) and (3). 
Now let us return to what I initially claimed would be the problematic premises, i.e.
(2) and (4). Here is premise (2):
Different points o f view makes sense, but only if  there is a common co-ordinate system on which to plot 
them.
(Davidson, OVICS, p. 184.)
It is tempting to read this premise as demanding not only the existence o f a “common 
system”, but also that we have some sort o f access to, or knowledge of, this system. 
Thus the premise may be said to have two possible readings— one ‘ontological’ and 
the other ‘epistemological’. The former demands only the existence o f a common 
system. The latter demands that we have some knowledge of the features o f this 
system.
The epistemological reading is supported by the metaphor o f ‘plotting’. This 
metaphor implies that the reason there must be a common system is to facilitate us in 
determining that different points of view are different. We are to differentiate points 
o f view by reference to something common to both. Points of view can be seen to 
differ when we compare how they organise or deal with common content. O f course, 
if  we are to defer to this common content in order to differentiate points o f view, then 
we must know something about the features of the “common co-ordinate system”.
Premise (4) is also concerned with this common system, but it initially seems 
to lend itself to an ontological reading. Here is the premise again:
the existence o f a conmion system belies the claim o f dramatic incomparability
(Davidson, OVICS, p. 184.)
Here all that is mentioned is “the existence of a common system”. There seems to be 
no demand for loiowledge of or access to this system. However, the premise seems 
more plausible if  we give it an epistemological reading. As with (2), both possibilities 
will be considered.
9$ee Kulm, op. cit., pp. 114-5.
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Let us begin our investigation o f premises (2) and (4) by reformalising 
Davidson’s paradox with the stronger epistemological reading of both premises.
Premises:
(1) There are different points of view.
(2) If (1), then we must have direct access‘d to a common system.
(3) Differing points o f view are incomparable.
(4) If  we have direct access to a common system, then -i(3).
Conclusion:
(5) We must have direct access to a common system, but we do not have direct access 
to a common system.
On the strong readings o f (2) and (4) we get a contradiction, and so Davidson’s 
Paradox holds. Davidson, o f course, wants to blame the first premise for this 
unacceptable conclusion. But could any o f the other assumptions be put aside in order 
to overcome the conclusion?
The relativist might want to insist that (2) is too strong, and should be replaced 
by the weaker ontological reading:
(2) If there are different points o f view, then there must exist a common system.
The argument would then be as follows:
Premises:
(1) There are different points o f view.
(2) If (1), then a common system must exist.
(3) Differing points o f view are incompai able.
(4) If we have direct access to a common system, then ~i(3).
Conclusion:
(5) A common system must exist, but we do not have direct access to a common 
system.
10 B y  “direct access” I mean laiowledge not acquired or justified via a perspective— i.e. a ‘G od’s Eye 
V iew’, one not associated with a particular scheme.
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The conclusion is now clearly not a contradiction. Nor does it seem unacceptable. It 
may very well be the case that there is a common system, or a common source of 
content, but that we do not have any knowledge o f it except tlii'ough our own scheme.
But Davidson can respond in kind by replacing the strong epistemological 
reading o f (4) with the weaker ontological reading. Since the consequent o f (2) and 
the antecedent o f (4) are now again the same, a contradiction again results. At this 
stage, there are two options open to the schemer. Firstly, she can try to reject (2) 
altogether. Or secondly, she can try to reject (4) altogether. The two options will be 
considered in turn.
Firstly, then, what if  the schemer were to reject (2) altogether, i.e. reject the 
idea that the existence o f differing points of view implies anything about ‘common 
systems’? This view entails that there is no common thing that schemes ‘organize’ 
differently. As was said before, the reason that the positing of alternative conceptual 
schemes was viewed as explanatory was because differences in world view, physical 
theoiy etc., could be explained in terms o f difference(s) o f conceptual scheme. That 
is, different schemes organise content differently, and hence a different world view 
results. If  there is no common thing that conceptual schemes organise, then difference 
could just as well be explained without reference to conceptual schemes at all. If 
there is not something shared between different individuals, cultures or periods— e.g. 
the world, experience, nature, or, in generally some source of content— then 
differences o f  world view between individuals, cultures, and periods would not be as a 
result o f different conceptual schemes. Rather, world-views would be different 
because the world would be different. So, rejecting the existence of something 
common to different conceptual schemes undermines the explanatory power of
conceptual lelativism, and does away with any need to posit conceptual change across 
cultures etc.
So, both the epistemological and ontological reading of (2) contribute to the 
unacceptable conclusion o f Davidson s paradox. And, while the schemer may reject 
the strong epistemological reading o f (2), she cannot reject the ontological reading (2). 
For to do so would be to imdermine conceptual relativism, and hence the scheme- 
content dualism, altogether.
The schemer’s final resort then is to attempt to reject (4). Her position is 
looking increasingly difficult. However, it appears that her last option may be the one 
that saves her. Flere is a reason to thinlc that she might be able to reject (4), and thus 
avoid Davidson’s paradox. As we have seen, Davidson must weaken (4) to an 
ontological reading in order to maintain the paradox. So (4) now claims that if  there 
is a common system (an ontological claim), then differing points o f view camiot be 
incomparable. But the mere existence of such a system does not undermine 
incomparability. Even granting that differing points o f view only make sense if  there
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is such a common system, the relativist can still maintain that schemes are 
incomparable. She can do so because the antecedent of (4) is an ontological, and not 
an epistemological claim. A ‘common system’ or source o f content can exist without 
anyone have a ‘God’s Eye View’ o f it, and so the antecedent of (4) can be true while 
the consequent is false. Thus (4) can be rejected by the schemer as a false premise.
We can now sum up what we have learnt so far. Davidson’s paradox rests on 
an alleged contradiction between the method for identifying alternative conceptual 
schemes, and the necessity for conceptual schemes to be incomparable. The idea is 
that we could only tell that conceptual schemes are different if  we could determine 
how each organised the content that is common to them all. That is, to tell whether 
schemes are different, we must compaie them via what they have in common— i.e. a 
common source o f content (e.g. the world, experience, etc.). But this would, of 
coui'se, undermine incomparability. The solution to the paradox that is now offered 
involves the rejection o f premise (4). This premise, on its ontological reading, can be 
rejected because the mere existence o f common content, or a ‘common system’ does 
not undermine incomparability. Only ‘direct’ knowledge of such a common source of 
content can undermine incomparability. The problem with this solution is that if  we 
do not have direct knowledge o f a common source, then how are we to tell that 
conceptual schemes are different? Thus the solution must be supported by a 
demonstration that it is possible to identify alternative conceptual schemes without 
appeal to direct or unconceptualised laiowledge of the source of content. Such a 
demonstration attempts to make sense o f ‘uninterpreted content’. That is, it attempts 
to make sense o f the idea that there is a scheme-content dualism, but that we cannot 
know anything about the source of content. There is such a source, and it supplies us 
all with the same information, which our schemes ‘organise’. But we cannot loiow 
anything about this source of content, or about the information it supplies us with, 
except through our conceptual scheme. Thus we must make sense o f there being such 
a source, and o f our conceptual scheme ‘organising’ or ‘interpreting’ the uninterpreted 
information or content that it supplies us with.
However, Davidson spends the majority o f his time in OVICS arguing that 
such a demonstration is impossible, and thus we cannot make sense o f the notion of 
uninterpreted content.
Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 will deal with Davidson’s aiguments against such a 
demonstration, but before that there is one more aspect o f Davidson’s strategy against 
the schemer that must be discussed and defended— that is, the claim that “[w]e may 
accept the doctrine that associates having a language with having a conceptual 
scheme.” '*
"D avidson, op. cit., 184.
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2.3. Languages and Conceptual Schemes.
Anyone who reads OVICS is more likely to thinlc that it is mainly about the 
impossibility of non-translatable languages rather than about attacking a possible 
response to something called ‘Davidson’s Paradox’. In this section I will show what 
non-translatable languages have to do with ‘Davidson’s Paradox’, and how arguing 
that there are no non-translatable language will suffice to show that the paradox holds 
in the face o f the possible response suggested in 2.2.
Davidson claims that (for the schemer at least) languages must be associated 
with conceptual schemes in such a way that translation cannot occur between any two 
languages associated with two different schemes. So the schemer might be able to 
identify conceptual difference by exploring linguistic difference. If the schemer could 
identify a language (whether this be through observation o f what appears to be 
linguistic activity, or investigation o f ‘texts’, or whatever) that was in principle non- 
translatable without making any appeal to knowledge o f uninterpreted content and its 
source, then he could claim to have identified conceptual difference while avoiding 
Davidson’s Paradox. The first step in thus “ [s]tudying the criteria o f translation ...
[as] a way o f focusing on criteria of identity for conceptual schemes” is to defend the 
claim that
[w]e may accept the doctrine that associates having a language with having a conceptual scheme. The 
relation may be supposed to be this: where conceptual schemes differ, so do languages. But speakers o f 
different languages may share a conceptual scheme provided there is a way o f translating one language 
into another.
(Davidson, OVICS, p. 184.)
There are two separate claims to be justified here. The first is that we can 
associate languages with conceptual schemes. The second is that we can associate 
language with conceptual scheme in the way suggested. These claims can be seen to 
be independent on recognition of the fact that one could accept the first while 
rejecting the second. In this section I will first deal with the more general claim that 
we can associate language with conceptual scheme. It will become clear why one 
should accept this claim, and what exactly the term “associate” means in this context. 
Then I will turn my attention to the more specific claim that inter-translatable 
languages should all be associated with the same scheme.
Firstly, then, the claim that we can associate language and conceptual scheme. 
Davidson’s argument is that not to do so will incur unacceptable results, and so it 
follows that we must associate language and scheme.
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The first o f these unacceptable results is as follows: if  language does not 
reflect the structure o f scheme, then language necessarily distorts reality. Reality is 
relative to scheme, so if  language does not reflect or agree with scheme, then it must 
distort reality. This view of language entails that “it is only wordlessly if  at all that 
the mind comes to grips with things as they really are” . And “[t]his is to conceive 
language as an in e rt. . . medium independent o f the human agencies that employ it; a 
view o f language that surely cannot be m a i n t a i n e d .” ' 2
It may seem strange to talk of language agreeing with or distorting reality. As 
Peter Hacker points out in his discussion o f OVICS, a language is a grammar and a 
vocabulary, and not in any sense a theory.
In a given language there is a possibility o f constructing indefinitely many different and incompatible 
theories, but the language in which such theories are constructed and articulated is itself no theoiy about 
anything.
(Hacker, “On Davidson’s Idea o f a Conceptual Scheme”, p. 297.)
If languages are not theories about anything, then what does Davidson mean by 
language “distorting reality”? Elsewhere, Davidson has said that “ [w]hat I had in 
mind as the scheme was language, with its built-in ontology and theory o f the 
world”. '3 We have yet to see how scheme and language are ‘associated’, but the 
quote does give us an insight into what Davidson has in mind when he is talking about 
language in OVICS. In OVICS language is not just a grammar and vocabulary.
Instead it is like a conceptual scheme in that it has its own “organizing structure”.
We will see in more detail what this organising structure consists in section 2.4.2, but 
for the time being it should be borne in mind what Davidson means by language in 
this context.'5 And if  we do this, it should be clear what Davidson means by language 
being ‘associated’ with conceptual scheme. A language is associated with a 
conceptual scheme if it embodies ontological commitments and a theory that concur 
with the organising structure o f that scheme— i.e. if  its ontological and theoretical 
commitments utilise only the conceptual tools of this particular scheme.
Returning to Davidson’s argument then, we can agree that language is neither 
inert nor independent o f speakers. But why are we forced to the conclusion that
'2 ibid., p. 185.
'^Davidson, “Meaning, Truth and Evidence” , p. 69.
'"'Davidson, OVICS, p. 184.
'^It may be pointed out in defence o f  D avidson’s taking language as having a built-in ontology and 
theory o f the world, that this is very much the view o f language held by Quine in “Two Dogmas” and 
Word and Object. And since Davidson is arguing against Quine, it will strengthen his argument if he 
grants as much to Quine as possible, and still shows that Quine is committed to the third and final 
dogma o f empiricism.
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language has these characteristics when we deny that languages can be associated with 
conceptual schemes? As we have seen, if  language is not associated with conceptual 
scheme it distorts reality, and so “it is only wordlessly if at all that mind comes to 
grips with things as they really are”. Consequently, language is not involved in any 
systematic way in the relation between mind and world—rather it undermines the 
relation. As it is not a reliable guide to reality, it will encourage false belief. And in 
doing so, it will misdirect an agent on how to act on his intentions, and to bring about 
desired changes in the world. So it will not serve as a link from world to mind, nor 
from mind to world.
However, according to Davidson, the unpleasant results o f claiming that 
language and scheme are not associated do not end here. He claims that the denial of 
such an association results not only in “a view o f language that surely cannot be 
maintained”, but also in a view of mind that is equally unsatisfactory.
[I]f the mind can grapple without distortion with the real, the mind itself must be without categories and 
concepts. This featureless s e l f . , . [is] an inescapable conclusion from certain lines o f reasoning . . .  but 
one that should always persuade us to reject the premisses.
(Davidson, OVICS, p. 185.)
This argument is not altogether convincing. Davidson presumably thinlcs that 
if  language will not serve as a link between mind and world, then mind itself must 
“grapple ... with the real”. But even if  he is right in this assumption, it does not 
follow that “the mind itself must be without categories and concepts.” Surely the 
mind could grapple with the real by virtue of certain mental categories? Thus, the 
schemer could still insist that reality is relative to a scheme. The fact that the scheme 
is purely mental, and not reflected in language, does not undermine this claim in any 
way. Therefore, it seems that Davidson is mistaken in believing that if  language is not 
associated with scheme, then minds are featureless (i.e. without categories or 
concepts). Nonetheless, it remains the case that thinking of language and scheme as 
absolutely separate entails an unacceptable view of language— i.e. that it is 
independent o f the human agencies that employ it. Hence we should rather associate 
language and scheme.
How, then, is language to be associated with scheme? In answering this 
question we turn our attention to Davidson’s more specific claim about the 
relationship. As we have seen, he states that
'^Davidson, OVICS, p. 185.
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[t]he relation may be supposed to be this; where conceptual schemes differ, so do languages. But 
speakers o f different languages may share a conceptual scheme provided there is a way o f translating 
one language into another.
(Davidson, OVICS, p. 184.)
Why so? Two reasons. Firstly, Davidson maintains that “[sjtudying the criteria of 
translation is . . .  a way o f focusing on criteria o f identity for conceptual schemes”.
We limit our focus to the relation between language and scheme, and put to one side 
issues about how mind might relate to language and scheme. If we “have to imagine 
mind, with its organizing categories, operating with a language with its organizing 
structure”, we lose this focus, and unnecessarily complicate the issue by having to 
woiTy over whether mind or language “is to be master”."
But while this may justify us in putting issues about mind and scheme to one 
side, we still have not explained why language and scheme should be related in the 
way suggested above. Why should “criteria o f translation” serve as “criteria of 
identity for conceptual schemes”? In answering this, we get our second reason. I 
have already argued that it is essential for alternative conceptual scheme to be 
incommensurable. Conceptual relativism, and hence the very idea of conceptual 
schemes, makes no sense if  there can be comparison across schemes. If languages are 
associated with schemes in such a way that translatable languages are linked to 
differing schemes, then incommensurability will be undermined. And so will the 
whole idea o f conceptual schemes. So,
(1) schemes must be incomparable
(2) if  languages associated with two such schemes are translatable, then the schemes 
will not be incomparable
(3) hence language(s) associated with one particular scheme must not be translatable 
into languages associated with another scheme.
Where translation is possible between languages, these languages must be associated 
with the same conceptual scheme.
To sum up, we have seen how Davidson may defend the following claims: on 
accepting the scheme-content dualism we may (1) associate languages with 
conceptual schemes, and (2) hold that “[t]he relation may be supposed to be this: ... 
speakers o f different languages may share a conceptual scheme provided there is a 
way of translating one language into the other.” (1) was justified by the fact that 
rejecting it led to an unacceptable view of language as “independent of the human
"  ibid., p. 184.
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agencies that employ it.” '^ (2) was justified by the fact that rejecting it would make 
incomparability (incommensurability) impossible, and so undermine the scheme- 
content dualism itself
These views o f the relation between language and scheme might, however, 
have their own unpalatable implications. Davidson himself suggests that if  languages 
are associated with conceptual schemes in the way just mentioned, one might think it 
possible to “take up a vantage point for comparing conceptual schemes by temporarily 
shedding one’s o w n ” . "  The idea here is that if  the schemer is only committed to 
language being associated with conceptual scheme, then she could step outside her 
own point o f view simply by appealing to thought rather than language. Maybe mind 
is not associated with scheme or point o f view like language, and hence could offer us 
such a “vantage point” . Davidson denies that this move is possible, since
[languages we will not think o f as separable from souls; speaking a language is not a trait a man can 
lose while retaining the power o f thought.
(Davidson, OVICS, p. 185.)
But in doing so, it seems Davidson is disregarding his own advice. As we saw above, 
he suggests that it is sensible to concentrate on language and translation as “a way of 
focusing on criteria o f identity for conceptual schemes” o^, because not to do so would 
double our work,
for then we would have to imagine the mind, with its ordinaiy categories, operating with a language 
with its organizing structure. Under the circumstances we would certainly want to ask who is to be 
master.
(Davidson, OVICS, p. 184.)
The question o f “who is master” is indeed a controversial one— one need only thinlc 
about the inconclusive discussions o f Wittgenstein’s private language argument, and 
Davidson’s own theses on the subject in “Thought and Talk”. '^ We have been given 
the sensible advice to avoid the issue if  at all possible. But Davidson’s argument 
against the possibility o f ‘shedding’ is that “speaking a language is not a trait a man 
can lose while retaining the power of t h o u g h t ” .22 Here we have a judgement about 
“who is to be master”, and a judgement with no argument to support it.
p. 185. 
ibid., p. 185.
20/W .,  p. 184.
2 'Davidson, “Thought and Talk”, in his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, pp. 155-70. 
22 Davidson, OVICS, p. 185.
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Such an argument is, however, close at hand. In the previous paragraph it was 
argued that “if  mind can grapple without distortion with the real, the mind itself must 
be without categories and concepts”, and hence featureless— an unacceptable 
conclusion that divorces the mind from the traits that constitute it.23 I rejected this 
argument because it seemed that even if  language was not to be associated with 
conceptual scheme, mind might still be, and so might grapple with the real via 
concepts and categories. However, in the case of ‘shedding’ language, and hence 
conceptual scheme, via the mind, this argument will be effective. If thought does 
allow us to shed our scheme and grapple directly with the uninterpreted content which 
different schemes interpret, then mind must be without categories and concepts. But 
does this entail that it is featureless? Perhaps not, since in ‘grappling’ with reality the 
mind might come to reflect the features of this reality free of distorting schemes. This 
view implies that this ‘reality’ has features, which it may not. But even if  we accept 
that it does, this attempt at gaining a vantage point outside all schemes can be shown 
to fail. For if  mind does, in whatever way, reflect the features of reality, then it must 
do so via some basic categories and concepts. Therefore, mind will be embedded in a 
conceptual scheme, albeit the ‘right’ one. Thus an appeal to thought will not allow us 
to step outside scheme. Disregarding our language and turning instead to thought will 
not allow us to ‘shed’ scheme. If mind could help us to disentangle ourselves from 
our scheme or point o f view, then it would be featureless— an unacceptable result.
And if  it is not featureless, it cannot be without categories and concepts, and so 
embodies a conceptual scheme.
We are now justified in associating having a language with having a 
conceptual scheme, and so we may study the criteria of translation as “a way of 
focusing on criteria of identity for conceptual schemes”. Languages must be 
associated with conceptual scheme, for not to do so leads to an unacceptable view o f 
language, and they must be associated with schemes in the way Davidson suggests 
because not to do so would undermine incomparability. Finally, in focusing on 
language and its relation to scheme, we do not allow the possibility o f shedding 
scheme by shedding language.
In accepting “the doctrine that associates having a language with having a 
conceptual scheme”, Davidson’s strategy against the schemer is fixed. We saw in 
section 2.2 that the schemer’s only option in the face o f Davidson’s paradox was to 
reject the claim that an ontological commitment to a common something which all 
schemes organised undermines incomparability. The problem with this move is that it 
requires the schemer to demonstrate how we are to identify different conceptual 
schemes if we cannot have any direct knowledge o f the common thing that different
23 ibid., p. 185.
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schemes organise. Focusing on language, in the way Davidson suggests, may help the 
schemer. Since languages are associated with schemes, we may identify schemes by 
their associated languages. And since languages associated with one scheme cannot 
be translated into languages associated with another scheme, then we may identify 
alternative conceptual schemes by identifying non-translatable languages. A non- 
translatable language will serve as a criterion for identifying an alternative conceptual 
scheme.24 The obvious advantage o f this approach is that it makes no appeal to direct 
laiowledge o f common content or the common world that schemes share. Davidson’s 
strategy then is to show that we cannot identify non-translatable languages, and thus 
we have no evidence of conceptual difference. “My strategy will be to argue that we 
cannot make sense o f total failure [of translation]. ”25
2.4. Non-Translatable Languages
Introduction.
In OVICS Davidson considers two contemporary attempts by schemers to 
demonstrate that non-translatable languages can serve as evidence for alternative 
conceptual schemes. The first is a strategy associated most famously with Thomas 
Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend. The second is the strategy advocated by Davidson’s main 
target— Quine. The former will be discussed in section 2.4.1, and the latter in 2.4.2.
The first strategy is to claim that a certain kind of meaning change will serve 
as evidence for conceptual change. This special type o f meaning change (sometimes 
called meaning variance’) only occurs as a result o f a certain type o f theory c h a n g e .2 6
We may now seem to have a formula for generating distinct conceptual schemes. We get a new out o f 
an old scheme when the speakers o f  a language come to accept as true an important range o f  sentences 
they previously took to be false (and, o f  course, vice versa). We must not describe this change simply 
as a matter o f their coming to view old falsehoods as truths, for a truth is a proposition, and what they 
come to accept, in accepting a sentence as true, is not the same thing that they rejected when formerly 
they held the sentence to be false. A change has come over the meaning o f the sentence because it now 
belongs to a new language.
(Davidson, OVICS, p. 188.)
24/6/c/., pp. 184-5 , 190-1.
25/6 /c/., p. 185.
Kuhn, The Structure o f  Scientific Revolutions, chapter X, and Feyerabend, “Explanation, Reduction 
and Empiricism”, section 7.
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What signifies conceptual change, then, is a change in theoiy and language. This 
change does not simply involve a redistribution o f truth values across the statements 
o f a theory, but a revision of the meanings o f these statements. This change in 
meaning is supposed to result from a change in the descriptive resources o f the 
language— i.e. a change in the concepts embodied in the language. Thus this type of 
change in meaning is to serve as evidence for conceptual change. The new language 
cannot, o f course, be translated into the old (if it could, then incomparability would be 
undermined). But such a change in language can be identified by the retention o f old 
vocabulary used in a new way. For example, while Einsteinean dynamics retains 
much o f the Newtonian vocabulaiy, these terms no longer have the same meaning. 
They have a new meaning as a result o f being part of a new language, and this new 
language caimot be translated into the old .22
The second strategy is to explain non-translatable languages and their relation 
to alternative schemes by reference to the notion o f ‘empirical content’. The idea is 
that languages associated with different conceptual schemes will have different 
relations to empirical content. Or, to put it in terms closer to what Quine says in 
“Two Dogmas”, empirical content is distributed through the language differently 
depending on what conceptual scheme it embodies. If all languages stand in a certain 
relation with empirical content, then a language (whether it is translatable or not) can 
be recognised as being a language if  it can be discovered that it stands in some 
relation to empirical content. Thus, non-translatable languages can be recognised by 
investigation o f how they relate to empirical content, and since the language relates to 
content in the way it does (at least partly) because o f the conceptual scheme it 
embodies, then recognition o f non-translatable languages will also be recognition of 
alternative conceptual schemes.
I will now consider each strategy in more detail, beginning with the strategy o f 
meaning variance.
2.4.1. Meaning Variance and Non-Translatable Languages.
According to Kuim, scientists operating in different scientific traditions (within different ‘paradigm s’) 
‘work in different w orlds’. Strawson’s The Bounds o f  Sense begins with the remark that ‘It is possible 
to imagine kinds o f worlds veiy different h orn the world as we know it’. ... The metaphors are, 
however, not at all the same. Strawson invites us to imagine possible non-actual worlds, worlds that 
might be described, using our present language, by redistributing truth values over sentences in various 
systematic ways. The clarity o f  the contrasts between the worlds in this case depends on supposing our 
scheme o f  concepts, our descriptive resources, to remain fixed. Kuhn, on the other hand, wants us to
22see Kuhn, op. cit., pp. 101-2.
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think o f  different observers o f the same world who come to it with inconnnensurable systems o f 
concepts. Strawson’s many imagined worlds are seen or heard or described from the same point o f 
view; K uhn’s one world is seen from different points o f view. It is the second metaphor we want to 
work on.
(Davidson, OVICS, pp. 186-7.)
As Davidson presents him, Kuhn is a schemer. He wishes to explain difference in 
world-view by pointing to differences in conceptual a p p a r a t u s .^ s  As a schemer, he 
must grant that all schemes ‘organise’ or ‘give form to ’ something common to all 
schemes. But in order to avoid Davidson’s paradox, he must not rely on laiowledge 
o f this common something as evidence for alternative conceptual schemes. We have 
already heai d a little o f Kulm’s solution to the problem (which is also endorsed by 
Feyerabend). Conceptual change and/or difference can be identified by an appeal to 
meaning variance. Meaning variance is to serve as evidence for conceptual 
difference.
This section is to consider Kuhn and Feyerabend’s attempted solution. Firstly, 
I will present some common arguments for the theory-dependence o f meaning. 
Secondly, following Davidson, I will explain how the theory-dependence o f meaning 
is to support the scheme-content dualism. Finally, I will examine Davidson’s 
argument against this defence o f the dualism o f scheme and uninterpreted content.
The Failure o f  Reductionism (Again).
The acceptance o f the view that meaning is theory-dependent is closely linlced with 
the rejection o f reductionism, and the reductionist construal of analyticity, to be found 
in Quine. Some historians of philosophy see Kuhn’s work as a reaction against pure 
‘logical analysis’, replacing Carnapian analysis of scientific language with 
considerations of the social factors that determine meaning in scientific l a n g u a g e .2 9  
More specifically, the shortcomings of the Positivist approach to scientific language 
serve as a springboard for the theories of Kuhn and Feyerabend. In this section, some 
of these shortcomings will be highlighted, and it will be demonstrated how these 
shortcomings support the thesis o f meaning variance or the theory-dependence of 
meaning.
A central problem for an empiricist philosophy of science is to account for the 
meaning o f theoretical terms. Since these terms refer to unobservables, it is not 
difficult to see why an empiricist would be uneasy about them. Two o f the strengths
28/6/d/., section IX, especially, pp. 102-3, 109.
29See, for example, Friedman, “Logical Positivism”, p. 794, and Papineau, Theory and Meaning, pp. 
35-7.
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of empiricism are that it promises straight-forward answers to two central questions—  
the “semantico-ontological question” and the “epistemological question”.
On the semantico-ontological question o f what our exjaressions refer to empiricism says simply that 
each expression refers to that entity which is the object o f the associated sense impression. And it deals 
ju st as comfortably with the epistemological question o f how we can know  whether a given statement is 
true— any statement can in principle be assessed for truth by reference to the sensory experiences we 
actually have,
(Papineau, Theory and Meaning, p. 5.)
However, theoretical terms make these questions rather more difficult for the 
empiricist to answer.
Firstly, what entities do theoretical terms refer to? The empiricists cannot say 
that they refer to the “object of the associated sense impression”, because it seems that 
there are no associated sense impressions. Theoretical entities are, as we have said, 
non-observable. Secondly, how do we know whether a given statement containing 
theoretical terms is tme? Again, and for the same reason, the empiricist’s initial 
answer will not do. We camiot assess theoretical statements for truth “by reference to 
the sensory experiences we actually have”, because none of our sensory experiences 
have as their object an entity referred to by theoretical terms. It seems that since 
theoretical terms refer to unobservable entities, empiricism can tell us nothing about 
what they mean, what they refer to, or how theoretical statements are to be verified.
To solve this problem, empiricists have insisted that even though theoretical 
entities are unobservable, it is not the case that they cannot be associated with certain 
sensory experiences. Various attempts were made by the Logical Positivists to 
explain how theoretical terms are thus ‘associated’. One such attempt concluded that 
all theoretical terms were explicitly definable in terms of observation expressions.
This view was supported by the aspirations o f what Quine calls ‘radical 
reductionism’.30 (We have seen an example o f radical reductionism in section 1.3—  
that o f Carnap in “The Elimination o f Metaphysics” .)
However, it soon became evident that the claims of radical reductionism were 
too strong, and “[b]y the middle o f the century most empiricist philosophers of 
science had come to accept that theoretical terms neither are, nor should be, precisely 
definable in observational language.”3' Instead it was claimed that there were two 
scientific languages— theoretical and observational—joined by ‘correspondence 
r u l e s ’.32 The solution to the problem of theoretical terms offered by this ‘double
3®Quine, “Two Dogmas”, pp. 39-40.
3'Papineau, op. cit., p. 10.
32see, for example, Nagel, The Structure o f  Science, ch. 5.
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language model’ was not unlike that offered by radical reductionism. While not 
claiming that theoretical terms and statements were completely reducible to 
observation terms and statements, the double language model did maintain that the 
meaning o f theoretical terms depended on the comiections between theoretical and 
observational language. And since theoretical statements could still be linked to 
obseiwational ones, it was still possible for the double language model to defend the 
classical empiricist answers to the semantico-ontological and epistemological 
questions.
Or so it initially seemed. In fact, neither radical reductionism nor the double 
language model could succeed in solving the problem of theoretical terms. And they 
both failed for the same reasons— because reductionisms o f this sort both under- and 
over-define theoretical t e r m s .3 3
Firstly, whichever type o f reductionism we endorse, it will under-deflne many 
theoretical terms. We may allow that it is possible to pick out sensory experiences (or 
associated observational terms) that will encourage the application o f a theoretical 
term. Even so, the theoretical term will often be applicable when these sensory 
conditions do not obtain. For example, a reductionist may explicate the simple 
theoretical term ‘temperature’ in terms o f observable readings on thermometers. It is 
clear, though, that we may meaningfully attribute temperature to a body in the absence 
o f such observations. This under-definition can be generalised as follows:
[MJost, if  not all, theoretical terms are dispositional with respect to observations: they specify that 
certain observable features would be displayed if certain circumstances were to obtain. That an entity 
does do something observable in actual circumstances is o f course a circumstance describable in 
observational terms. But that it would do something observable in different circumstances, is not itself 
an observable state o f  affairs, nor is it clear how it can be reduced to one.
(Papineau, Theory and M eaning, p. 6.)
Secondly, reductionism over-defmes theoretical terms. This results from the 
fact that there is often more than one observational method for determining whether a 
theoretical term is applicable. Consider ‘temperature’ again. We may discover the 
temperature o f a body by applying a mercury thermometer to it, or a gas thermometer, 
or an alcohol thermometer, etc. Which o f these various methods then is to serve as a 
reductive definition of the theoretical term? We cannot decide between them for 
purely observational reasons, for they are all legitimate observation methods. Then 
perhaps we should allow that the term may be defined by reference to all the 
observation methods. But what if  there is disagreement between any o f the
33ln what follows I closely follow the presentation o f  these issues in Papineau, op. cit., pp. 6-18.
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methods— what if  our gas thermometers and our mercury thermometers give different 
readings for the same body at the same time? In this case the observational situation 
is clear (i.e. there is no denying that the methods disagree in result). But there is no 
way o f deciding between them. We cannot determine which observation definition is 
wrong (since there is no right and wrong in this case, only definition). Therefore, the 
observational definitions overdefine the term ‘temperature’.
If reductionism both under- and over-defines theoretical terms, it is clear that it 
offers no solution to the problem of theoretical terms. Firstly, consider the problem of 
what theoretical terms refer to. Because o f the under-definition o f theoretical terms 
by reductionism, this reductionism (whatever form it takes) will not serve to 
determine the referent of theoretical terms. If the application of the observational 
terms and/or statements associated with a theoretical term do not exhaust all the 
possible applications o f the theoretical term, then it cannot be claimed that the referent 
o f the theoretical term is merely the object (or objects) of the sense experiences allied 
to the observational terms and statements.
Also, the over-definition o f theoretical terms by reductionism undermines the 
ability o f this reductionism to determine the referent of theoretical terms. Since it 
may be unclear which o f the observational terms associated with a theoretical term is 
to determine its meaning, then it cannot be claimed that the referent o f the theoretical 
term is the object o f sense experiences allied to any particular obseiwational term.
Secondly, we may consider the problem of how we loiow that a statement 
containing a theoretical term is true. Since theoretical terms are under-defined by 
reductionism, a statement containing theoretical terms may be true even when the 
sense experiences associate with that term do not occur. And since theoretical terms 
are also over-defined by reductionism, it is not clear which sense experiences 
associated with a theoretical term do confirm a statement containing that term and 
which do not.
The Theory-Dependence o f  Meaning.
The failure o f the reductionist project in philosophy of science led many (including 
Kuhn and Feyerabend) to question the worth o f a complete separation o f the 
theoretical from the observable. Instead of attempting to reduce theoretical terms to 
observation terms, it was now suggested that how we apply observation terms is, in 
some way, theory-dependent. This section attempts to outline some arguments for 
this new approach.
Such an approach completely reverses the direction of explanation. Now we 
are to look to theory in order to understand observation, where before we did the exact 
opposite. The latter approach, as we have seen, had its own problems. However, we
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can at least say that it is rather more intuitive than the former. It is intuitive because 
we think that we have a better understanding o f observation language than theoretical 
language. Observational terms are associated with sensory events, and as a result it is 
fairly clear when they apply and when not, and to what. Theoretical terms, on the 
other hand, refer to unobseiwable entities, so we do not know when to apply them, or 
to what. Therefore, it seems intuitive to try to understand the latter in terms o f the 
former, and not vice versa.
However, the supporters o f the view that the meaning o f observation terms are 
theory-dependent consider such intuitions to be wrong. It is not the case, they say, 
that observational terms can be individually and clearly assigned a certain set of 
sensory circumstances which warrant their application. Rather it is our theoretical 
generalisations that govern how observation terms are associated with sensory 
experiences.34
Both Kulm and Feyerabend defend such a view. Kuhn suggests that changes 
in theory prompt changes in what scientists ‘see’. He suggests that these changes in 
observation are not unlike ‘gestalt switches’, and he finds much work in psychology 
on perception and gestalt switches as suggestive of how observation is influenced by 
theory.
It is as elementary prototypes for these transformations o f  the scientist’s world that the familiar 
demonstrations o f  a switch in visual gestalt prove so suggestive. What were ducks in the scientist’s 
world before the revolution are rabbits afterwards. The man who first saw the exterior o f  the box from 
above later sees its interior from below. Transformations like these, though usually more gradual and 
almost always irreversible, are common concomitants o f scientific training. Looking at a contour map, 
the student sees lines on paper, the cartographer a picture o f a terrain. Looking at a bubble-chamber 
photograph, the student sees confused and broken lines, the physicist a record o f familiar subnuclear 
events.
(Kuhn, The Structure o f  Scientific Revolutions, p. I I I . )
Once the student has learned to ‘see’ like the scientist, he becomes an inhabitant of 
the scientist’s world. According to Kuhn, this world “is n o t ... fixed once and for all 
by the nature of the environment, on the one hand, and of science, on the other.” 
Instead, “it is determined jointly by the environment and the particular normal- 
scientific tradition that the student has been trained to p u r s u e . ” 35
34The reader may have noticed that there is an unmistakable echo o f Quine’s views concerning the 
‘meaning’ o f observation terms and statements in this approach to the meaning o f scientific terms. 
35Kuhn, op. cit., p. 112. To demonstrate the point, Kuhn lists several examples from the history o f 
science, ibid., pp. 115-7 (astronomy), 117-8 (electricity), 118 (chemistry), 118-20 (dynamics).
45
If  observation is thus theory-dependent, then there is at least one obvious way 
in which meaning is also theory-dependent. If what we see is influenced by theory, 
then what we say in response to our sense experience is also theory-dependent.^^
At one time a certain set o f sense experiences are associated with a certain word, in the sense that their 
occurrence is generally taken to warrant the w ord’s application [whether it be a theoretical or 
observational term]. But then we discover by reference to our theories that those experiences do not 
warrant the w ord’s application after all, that they can well occur in cases where the word is not 
applicable.
(Papineau, Theory and M eaning, p. 26.)
Theory-Dependence and Conceptual Change.
If we grant that philosophers like Kuhn and Feyerabend are correct in thinking that 
meaning is theory-dependent in this way, how is this to help them defend the scheme- 
content distinction? Kuhn argues that a change in theory (“paradigm”) involves “a 
displacement o f the conceptual network through which scientists view the world.” '^^  
That is, a change in theory is a change in conceptual scheme. If meaning is theory- 
dependent, then a change in theoiy will also involve a change in meaning. It could 
then be argued that a change in meaning could serve as evidence for a change in 
conceptual scheme.
As we have seen, this change in meaning is of a special sort:
We must not describe this change [in meaning] simply as a matter of . . .  [scientists] coming to view old 
falsehoods as truths, for a truth is a proposition, and what they come to accept, in accepting a sentence 
as true, is not the same thing that they rejected when formerly they held the sentence to be false. A 
change has come over the meaning o f the sentence because it now belongs to a new language.
(Davidson, OVICS, p. 188.)
Since theory influences observation, a change in theory brings about a change 
in observation. “Led by a new paradigm, scientists adopt new instruments and look in 
new places. Even more important[ly], during [scientific] revolutions scientists see 
new and different things when looking with familiar instruments in places they have 
looked before.”38 Seeing the world anew leads to a new association o f terms 
(theoretical and obseiwational) and sensations. This change in association produces a 
new language because both the associations and  the sensory experiences themselves
^‘^ Paplneau, op. cit., pp. 26- 
^^Kuhn, op. cit., p. 102. 
^^ibid., p. 111.
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are shaped by a new theory. The new view does not simply reject and replace old 
associations, but rather associates language anew with a different reality. While old 
falsehoods may appear to be now held true (and vice versa), things are not so simple. 
Scientific vocabulaiy may remain largely unchanged from one theory to the next, but 
the different physical referents and verification conditions assigned to those terms by 
various theories mean that while vocabulary may stay much the same, meaning does 
not.^^
Now we may have a formula for generating distinct conceptual schemes:
We get a new out o f an old scheme when the speakers o f  a language come to accept as true an 
important range o f sentences they previously took to be false (and, o f course, vice versa).
(Davidson, OVICS, p. 188.)
and  this change must not simply involve a redistribution o f truth values, but a change 
o f meaning.'^o
D avidson’s Argument.
[T]he present question is ... whether, if such changes [in meaning] were to take place, we should be 
Justified in calling them alterations in the basic conceptual apparatus.
(Davidson, OVICS, p. 188.)
We have already seen that Davidson accepts that language change is a necessary 
condition for change in conceptual scheme (if we accept the scheme-content 
dualism).^* However, for a change in language to serve as clear evidence for a change 
in conceptual scheme, it must not only be a necessary condition, but also a sufficient 
condition for conceptual change. Davidson gives an example to illustrate the point:
Suppose that in my office as Minister o f Scientific Language I want the new man to stop using words 
that refer, say, to emotions, feelings, thoughts, and intentions, and to talk instead o f  the physiological 
states and happenings that are assumed to be more or less identical with the mental riff and raff. How 
do I tell whether my advice has been heeded if  the new man speaks a new language? For all I know, the 
shiny new phrases, though stolen from the old language in which they refer to physiological stirrings, 
may in his mouth play the role o f the messy old mental concepts.
(Davidson, OVICS, pp. 188-9.)
^^See footnote 26 above for references. 
^ODavidson, OVICS, pp. 187-8.
“^ ^See section 2.2 above.
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If language change is not a sufficient condition for conceptual change, then (as in this 
case) language may change while conceptual scheme does not. Therefore, language 
change will not serve to identify change in conceptual scheme.
But if  the schemer rises to this challenge, and claims that language change is 
both a necessary and  a sufficient condition for conceptual change, he will discover 
that he then has troubles elsewhere. If language change is a sufficient condition of 
conceptual change, then every time the former occurs, so does the latter. But if  every 
change in meaning is paralleled by a change in concepts, then, for the schemer to be 
consistent, she must insist that translatability between languages is, in principle, 
impossible.
To illustrate why, we may consider the following. Take two languages, L\ and 
^ 2 , and two conceptual schemes, C\ and C2 . Let Zj be associated with C\ ,and L2 
with C2 . As we have seen, L\ and Z2 must not be translatable into one another. If 
they were, then C\ and C2 were be comparable via these translations. And if 
conceptual schemes are comparable, their explanatoiy force is lost. Now, according 
to the schemer’s position in the last paragraph, all change in language may be 
associated with a change in conceptual scheme. So each language is associated with a 
different conceptual scheme. Therefore, there must be no translatability between 
languages, for if  there were, conceptual schemes would be comparable, and so 
unexplanatory.
The schemer may be prepared to bite the bullet here. Because o f the special 
meaning she assigns to ‘language’, she is not committed to the obvious falsity that 
French cannot be translated into English, or Arabic into G e r m a n . W h e n  she talks 
about ‘language’, she does not mean French, or German, Arabic or English. She 
holds that meaning is theory-dependent, and so that when theory changes, so does 
meaning. So, according to her, two speakers speak the same language if  and only if 
the meaning of their words are determined by the same theory. Therefore, a French 
and an English speaker who hold the same theory speak the same language.
But the schemer’s position is still an uncomfortable one, and for two reasons. 
Firstly, it is often argued that the theory-dependence account o f meaning implies an 
unpalatable relativism.^^ If the meaning of theoretical and observational terms are 
determined by theoiy, then different theories camiot be compared in order to 
determine which is superior (which one is more consistent with the empirical data). 
Since each theory interprets and shapes the data in its own way, there is no common 
ground between them, which we can refer to in order to make judgements about
42peter Hacker has stated that the schemer is committed to this obvious falsity. Hacker, “On 
Davidson’s Idea o f  a Conceptual Scheme”, pp.297-8.
^^See Papineau, op. cit., p. 41.
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which is better. If  both theoretical and observable entities are relative to theory, then 
all objectivity in the sciences is lost, and “it would seem impossible for a scientist 
ever to be rationally compelled to admit that the views of his opponents are preferable 
to his own.”"^"^
Nonetheless, the schemer may well still be prepared to bite the bullet and 
accept this relativism (as, for example, Feyerabend is^s). So now we may turn to the 
second reason for the schemer’s position being an uncomfortable one. Consider again 
Davidson’s claim about the man who stops talking about “the mental riff and ra ff’, 
and instead talks o f “physiological states and happenings”. According to Davidson, 
“ [f]or all I know, the shiny new phr ases ... may play the role o f the messy old mental 
concepts.”46 He goes on to say
The key phr ase here is: for all I know. What is clear is that I'etention of some or all o f  the old 
vocabulary in itself provides no basis forjudging the new scheme to be the same as, or different from, 
the old.
(Davidson, OVICS, p. 189.)
The schemer, as we know, must insist that language change is a sufficient 
condition for conceptual change. In Davidson’s example, the man changes theory— 
i.e. he holds certain sentences false which he previously held to be true. Some 
sentences, once held true, containing the terms ‘belief, ‘intention’, ‘feeling’, and 
‘emotion’, are now held to be false. Some sentences, once held false, containing 
physiological terms are now held true. And these changes have come about as a result 
o f a change in the meaning in mental and physiological terms. In this case, then, both 
theory and language change. Even so, it is still possible that the conceptual apparatus 
at work does not change. And if  language can change without conceptual scheme 
changing, then language change is not a sufficient condition for conceptual change (or 
at least we have no evidence that it is).
The schemer may respond with the following argument. Theory change is a 
necessaiy condition for language change (of the sort we are talking about).4? And 
theoiy change is a sufficient condition for conceptual change. So, if  language 
changes, then theory must also have changed. And if  theory changes, then conceptual 
scheme must change. Therefore, language change is a sufficient condition for 
conceptual change.
44/W ., p. 41.
45Feyerabend, Against Method, especially chs. 1,5,  11, 18-20. Kuhn, on the other hand, later distanced 
him self from these relativist conclusions. See, for example, op. cit., pp. 205-7.
^^Davidson, op. cit., p. 189.
^^Indeed, it may be a necessary and a sufficient condition.
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This argument, too, will fall foul o f Davidson’s example. Davidson’s example 
has shown not only that language change cannot be sufficient for conceptual change, 
but also that theory change cannot be sufficient for conceptual change (the latter is the 
second premise o f the schemer’s argument in the last paragraph). The man in the 
example changes his theory, but it is still possible for him to use the same “messy old 
mental concepts” . Therefore, it is possible to change theory without changing 
conceptual scheme. So, in contradiction o f the schemer’s claims, theory change is not 
sufficient for conceptual change.
Conclusion.
The Kuhnian argument presented by the schemer was that since (1) theory change 
signalled conceptual change, and (2) meaning change (of a certain sort) signalled 
theoiy change, then (3) meaning change (of a certain sort) would signal (or serve as 
evidence for) conceptual change. Davidson’s example o f the man who stops talking 
about the mental riff and raff, and instead talks about physiological stirrings, is 
supposed to demonstrate that it is possible for both theory and meaning change to 
occur without there being any change in conceptual scheme. This is possible because 
theory change does not necessarily signal conceptual change. One can change the 
theory, and hence change meaning or language, without change in conceptual 
apparatus. Thus it does not follow that meaning change will serve as evidence for 
conceptual change. So, even if  we could identify non-translatable languages by 
reference to their relation with theory, they would not serve as evidence for conceptual 
difference.
2.4.2. Empirical Content and Non-Translatable Languages.
Introduction.
Meaning variance was supposed to overcome Davidson’s paradox by making no 
claims about the source o f content at all. For Kuhn and Feyerabend all that was 
needed to identify alternative conceptual schemes was the ability to identify a certain 
type o f change in language. This approach was to avoid Davidson’s paradox by 
giving a criterion for identity o f conceptual schemes which did not demand any 
knowledge o f the common thing which different schemes organised or structured.
However, as demonstrated in the last section, this approach failed because 
change in language was not enough to ensure change in conceptual scheme. 
Therefore change in language could not serve as a criterion for identity o f conceptual 
schemes.
50
Having thus disposed o f meaning variance as a method for supporting 
conceptual relativism, Davidson considers an alternative approach. This time it is not 
language on its own that will serve to identify conceptual difference, but the relation 
between language and experience.
The idea is that something is a language, and associated with a conceptual scheme, whether we can 
translate it or not, if  it stands in a certain relation ... with experience. The problem is to say what the 
relation is, and to be clearer about the entities related.
The images and metaphors fall into two main groups: conceptual schemes (languages) either 
organize something, or they f i t i X ... The first group contains also systematize, divide up (the stream o f 
experience); further examples o f  the second group are predict, account fo r , face  (the tribunal o f 
experience).
(Davidson, OVICS, p. I91.)48
Differing relations o f language to experience are supposed to signal conceptual 
difference for the following reasons. If, with Quine, we endorse a new holistic 
empiricism (see 1.3), we know that theory is underdetermined by experience. There 
are many ways in which empirical content can be distributed through our theories and 
language, and that our choices about which distribution to endorse are governed by 
pragmatic concerns.
Quine suggests in “Two Dogmas” that some such pragmatic concerns may 
influence what conceptual scheme is like:
The issue over there being classes seems more a question o f convenient conceptual scheme; the issue 
over there being centaurs, or brick houses on Elm Street, seems more a question o f fact. But I have 
urged that this differences is only one o f degree, and that it turns upon our vaguely pragmatic 
inclination to adjust one strand o f the fabric o f science rather than another in accommodating some 
particular recalcitrant experience.
(Quine, “Two Dogmas”, p. 46.)
Thus the statements that are close to the centre of our web of belief determine the 
basic conceptual tools we employ in language. And, of course, what statements we 
have at or near the centre of our web is a matter o f pragmatic decision.
Quine continues in a similar vein in Word and Object.
4^For examples o f  both metaphors see Davidson, OVICS, pp. 190-1. References are made to Benjamin 
Whorf, Kuhn, Feyerabend, and Quine.
"^^Quine, “Two Dogmas”, pp. 42-6.
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We cannot strip away the conceptual trappings sentence by sentence and leave a description o f the 
objective world; but we can investigate the world, and man as a part o f it, and thus find out what cues 
he could have o f what goes on around him. Subtracting his cues from his world view, we get man’s net 
contribution as the difference. This difference marks the extent o f man’s conceptual sovereignty— the 
domain within which he can revise theory while saving the data.
(Quine, Word and Object, p. 5.)
Man can change theory while saving the data by deciding what statements are to be 
placed centrally in the web and what statements are to be at the periphery. In making 
different choices concerning the structure o f his theory, he can alter conceptual 
scheme and how scheme and empirical content relate, and thus he alters his world 
view. How language relates to (‘organises’ or ‘fits’) experience is thus determined by 
these pragmatic decisions.
We can then make sense o f there being alternative conceptual schemes by 
imagining that others may make radically different decisions concerning the shape of 
their theory than we have done. Thus, while their theory would still either organise or 
fit experience, the inner workings which allow it to do so would be radically different 
than ours. And we could identify alternative schemes if  we could tell that a language 
organised or fitted experience without being able to translate that language. But 
Davidson argues that we cannot determine that a language organises or fits experience 
without being able to translate it, and thus we cannot identify non-translatable 
languages (and thus associated schemes) by investigation o f their relation with 
experience.
First, then, I will examine why investigation of how language organises 
experience will not serve to identify alternative conceptual schemes.
Organising.
To talk o f language organising is to talk o f its referential apparatus.^® Language 
organises experience by distributing empirical content using its singular terms, 
predicates, and quantifiers. What these logical types refer to or quantify over are the 
‘posits’ o f theory.
Physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries— not by 
definition in terms o f experience, but simply as irreducible posits comparable, epistemologically, with 
the gods o f  H om er... The myth of physical objects is epistemologically superior to most in that it has
50Oavidson, OVICS, pp. 192-3.
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proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a managable structure into the flux o f 
experience.
(Quine, “Two Dogmas”, p. 44.)^^
Our pragmatic decisions about the structure o f theory are implemented by positing 
physical (and other) objects via the referential apparatus of our language. The way to 
identify alternative conceptual schemes then is by investigation o f the referential 
apparatus o f their associated languages. However, Davidson argues that such an 
investigation is only possible between translatable languages, and thus we cannot 
study languages that are associated with schemes other than our own, since they must 
be non-translatable. Therefore investigation o f how language organises experience 
camiot serve as a criterion for identifying non-translatable languages or alternative 
schemes.
A language may contain simple predicates whose extensions are matched by no simple predicates, or 
even by any predicates at all, in some other language. What enables us to make this point in particular 
cases is an ontology common to the two languages, with concepts that individuate the same objects.
(Davidson, OVICS, p. 192.)
We can make sense of languages other than our own in which the reference of 
singular terms and the extension o f predicates differs from ours. But this difference in 
extension does not mark a difference in conceptual scheme. While we may determine 
that other languages refer to, group and relate objects in different ways than we do, 
this all presupposes that our respective languages by and large quantify over the same 
objects. For languages that quantify over different objects there is obviously more 
than a difference in extension at stake. The question is whether we can make sense o f 
this difference without translation. The answer, according to Davidson, is no.
What allows comparison of extension between two languages is a shared set o f 
concepts, which “individuate the same objects” . But with two languages that are 
associated with different schemes, there cannot be anything in common. If there was, 
then the languages would be translatable by reference to this common thing (whatever 
it might be). And without anything in common, comparison of quantification or 
ontology is impossible. Thus we cannot make sense of how languages differ in 
ontological commitment without there being something that both languages share 
against which we could understand the difference. And if  such languages did share 
something, they would then be (to some extent) translatable, so we camiot make sense 
o f difference in quantification or ontological commitment without translation. Thus,
^*It is evident from this quote that the two metaphors o f organising and fitting are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive.
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comparison o f referential apparatus will not serve to identify non-translatable 
languages and so will not yield evidence for alternative conceptual schemes.
Fitting.
There is, however, another method for identifying non-translatable languages that may 
be salvaged from Quine. Returning to a quote from “Two Dogmas” given above:
Physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries— not by 
definition in terms o f  experience, but simply as irreducible posits comparable, epistemologically, with 
the gods o f  H om er.,. The myth o f physical objects is epistemologically superior to most in that it has 
proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a managable structure into the flux of 
experience.
(Quine, “Two Dogmas”, p. 44.)
we can see what this other option is. The aim o f a theory and its associated 
language(s) is primarily to “work a managable structure into the flux o f experience.” 
This can be done in any way we choose, as long as our theory ‘fits’ with experience—  
i.e. as long as the empirical implications o f our theory agree with experience. In short, 
our theory must be “borne out by the e v i d e n c e ” . of course, a theory may be borne 
out by the available evidence and yet be false. ^ 3 This being the case, a theory is true 
only if  it is borne out by “the totality of possible sensory evidence past, present, and
future” . 54
We do not need to pause to contemplate what this [i.e. fitting “the totality of possible sensory 
evidence”] might mean. The point is that for a theoiy to fit or face up to the totality o f  possible sensory 
evidence is for that theory to be true. I f  a theory quantifies over physical objects, numbers, or sets, 
what it says about these entities is true provided the theory as a whole fits the sensory evidence. One 
can see how, h orn this point o f  view, such entities might be called posits. It is reasonable to call 
something a posit if  it can be contrasted with something that is not. Here the something that is not is 
sensory evidence— at least that is the idea.
(Davidson, OVICS, p. 193.)
Now it looks like we can make sense of a language quantifying over different 
objects (etc.) than our own language without an appeal to translation. If we can 
determine whether a theory and associated language fits the totality o f possible
52Davidson, OVICS, p. 193. 
5 3 / W . ,  p .  193.
54/W ., p. 193.
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sensory evidence without an appeal to translation, then we may identify a non- 
translatable language, and thus identify an alternative conceptual scheme. We may be 
able to do so by investigation o f a speaker’s behaviour under different sensory 
stimulations.55 But again Davidson argues that to determine whether a theory and 
associated language fit with the evidence requires translation.
The argument is as follows. Firstly, it is argued that
[t]he trouble with the notion o f fitting the totality o f  experience, like the notion o f  fitting the facts, or o f 
being true to the facts, adds nothing intelligible to the simple concept o f being true.
(Davidson, OVICS, pp. 193-4.)
This being the case,
[o]ur attempt to characterize languages or conceptual schemes in terms o f the notion o f fitting some 
entity has come down, then, to the simple thought that something is an acceptable conceptual scheme or 
theory if it is true. Perhaps we better say largely true in order to allow sharers o f  a scheme to differ on 
details.
(Davidson, OVICS, p. 194.)
So,
the criterion o f a conceptual scheme different ftom our own now becomes: largely true but not 
translatable. The question whether this is a useful criterion is just the question how well we understand 
the notion o f  truth, as applied to language, independent o f  the notion o f translation.
(Davidson, OVICS, p. 194.)
Davidson maintains that we do not understand the notion truth (as applied to 
languages) independently o f translation at all. And since we do not, it follows that the 
criterion o f a conceptual scheme different from our own given by the fitting metaphor 
(i.e. “largely true but not translatable”) is not at all useful.
To defend this argument, one must show that the notion of fitting adds nothing 
to the simple concept o f being tme, and that we do not understand the notion o f truth 
(as applied to language) independent of translation. I will take each point in turn.
Firstly,
55Quine, Word and Object, pp. 26-79.
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The trouble is that the notion o f fitting the totality o f experience, like the notion o f  fitting the facts, or o f 
being true to the facts, adds nothing intelligible to the simple concept o f being true.
(Davidson, OVICS, p. 195.)
The notion of ‘being true to the facts’ is thought to add nothing new to the simple 
concept o f being true because it is considered by many to be either trivial or empty.56 
The notion is trivial in as much as it tells us that a sentence is true if it 
corresponds to the facts. Few would deny that true sentences agree with the facts, and 
the claim is so uncontroversial because it says little or nothing about how sentences 
are true or false. To be offered a sentences like
(1) The statement that Dublin is in Ireland corresponds to the facts 
as an explanation of
(2) The statement that Dublin is in Ireland is true
is to be offered nothing. (1) does not explain (2), but only rephrases it. This overly 
general version o f ‘fitting’ or ‘corresponding to ’ the facts adds nothing to the concept 
of being true.57
For a sentence like (1) to explain what makes our statements true or false, it 
must bring with it an account o f facts and correspondence that does not circle back 
immediately to truth.58 What we are looking for here is a correspondence relation 
between true statements and particular facts. Then an explanation o f (2) would be of 
the form
(3) The statement that Dublin is in Ireland corresponds to the fact that Dublin is in 
Ireland,
Generalising the strategy, we get
(4) A statement that p  is true if it corresponds to a fact that q.
As we have seen in (3), (4) holds when 'p ' and ‘^ ’ are replaced by the same sentence. 
However, according to Davidson, “after that the difficulties set in”.59
56Davidson, “True to the Facts” , p. 37. 
5^iW ., p. 41.
58 ibid., p. 41.
^^ibid., p. 41.
56
He argues that any attempt to construct an ontology o f facts corresponding to 
true statements will either result in ontological collapse, and hence triviality, or an 
individuation of facts that circles back immediately to truth. Thus the problems o f 
‘correspondence to the facts’ recur on an attempt to make sense o f ‘correspondence to 
the fact that’
Since we are concerned with fitting experience, the details o f Davidson’s 
arguments against facts are not to the point here.^i What we are to concern ourselves 
with is the moral. If  the totality o f sensory evidence is all the evidence there is, then 
the notion o f ‘fitting the totality o f sensory evidence’ is trivial in the same way that 
‘fitting the facts’ is trivial. A true sentence or theory will fit all possible evidence 
(sensory or otherwise) by virtue o f the fact that it is true. But knowing that a true 
statement fits all possible evidence tells us no more than does knowing that a true 
sentence corresponds to or fits the facts. Thus, it adds nothing to the concept o f being 
true.
In terms of experience, any attempt to be more specific, and hence less trivial, 
seems nonsensical. As Davidson points out, experience is not a thing that makes 
statements and theories true. Rather it is that experience takes a certain course 
(among other things) that makes statements and theories true. “To speak o f sensory 
experience rather than evidence ... expresses a view about the source or nature o f 
evidence, but it does not add a new entity to the universe against which to test 
conceptual s c h e m e s ” . ^2 And, as we have seen, to say that a sentence or theory ‘fits’ 
with the course taken by (all possible) experience is to say nothing more than that it is 
true.
So it seems that the notion o f fitting the totality o f sensory experience does not 
add anything to the simple concept o f being true. Indeed, Quine is prepared to grant 
as much.
There is nothing to add to Tarski’s analysis, Davidson rightly urges, so far as the concept o f  truth is 
concerned. ... I f  empiricism is construed as a theory o f truth, then what Davidson imputes to it as a 
third dogma is rightly imputed and rightly renounced.
(Quine, “On the Very Idea o f a Third Dogma”, p. 39.)
The second o f Davidson’s claims to be defended was:
These arguments can be found in ibid., pp. 41-3. It should also be noted that D avidson’s argument 
for ontological collapse rests on what is known as the ‘slingshot’ argument. This argument is highly 
controversial, and many philosophers have attacked it as unsound. See, for example, Barwise and 
Perry, “Semantic innocence and uncompromising situations” and Read, “The Slingshot Argument” , 
^^Davidson, OVICS, p. 194.
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Our attempt to characterize languages or conceptual schemes in terms of the notion o f fitting some 
entity has come down, then, to the simple thought that something is an acceptable conceptual scheme or 
theory if  it is true. Perhaps we better say largely true in order to allow sharers o f a scheme to differ on 
details. And the criterion o f a conceptual scheme different from our own now becomes; largely true but 
not translatable. The question whether this is a useful criterion is just the question how well we 
understand the notion o f  truth, as applied to language, independent o f the notion o f translation.
(Davidson, OVICS, p. 194.)
The criterion of an alternative conceptual scheme is then as follows. A theoiy which 
is true, but whose statements are non-translatable is to serve as the identifying mark o f 
the presence o f an alternative conceptual scheme. So, to be able to identify this 
presence, one must be able to determine that a theoiy is (largely) true without being 
able to translation the statements of that theory. Immediately this seems like an 
impossible task— how are we to determine the truth value of statements if  we can 
never know what they say? Indeed, it seems impossible even to determine the truth 
conditions o f a statement which we could never translate. And conversely, if  we did 
know the truth conditions of an assertoric statement, then it seems we would also 
know what it means, and thus be able to translate it.
In detailing this problem, Davidson points out that
[w]e recognize sentences like ‘ “Snow is white” is true if and only if snow is white’ to be trivially true. 
Yet the totality o f such English sentences uniquely determines the extension o f the concept o f truth for 
English.
(Davidson, OVICS, p. 194.)
Generalising this observation we get Tarski's material adequacy condition for a 
satisfactory theory o f truth. This condition simply states that a theory o f truth should 
have as consequences all such trivially true sentences in the language for which it is a 
theory o f truth. That is, it must entail the correct extension of the concept of truth for 
the said language. This material adequacy condition is summed up in Convention-T, 
which states that
a satisfactory theory o f truth for a language L must entail, for every sentence j  o f L, a theorem o f the 
form y  is true if  and only if p ' where ‘j ’ is replaced by a description of s  and ‘p ’ by 5  itself if  L is 
English, and by a translation o f j  into English if L is not English.
(Davidson, OVICS, p. 194.)
Thus the metalanguage in which the truth theory is expressed must contain all the 
expressions o f the object language, or translations o f these expressions. Thus it is
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impossible to understand the notion of truth as applied to any language L without 
being able to understand L (whether directly or in translation). We cannot tell 
whether a theory is true, and thus fits experience, if that language is non-translatable. 
So, again, non-translatable languages will not serve as evidence for conceptual
difference.<53
Conclusion.
The Quinean method of identifying alternative conceptual schemes involves 
investigation o f the relation between language and experience. According to Quine, 
there are numerous ways in which language and experience can be related, and what 
governs this relation are pragmatic considerations concerning the simplicity etc. of the 
theoiy. We may posit what we like in our theory, and associate these posits with 
experience as we choose, as long as doing so aids us in predicting and coping with 
experience. This freedom to posit what we wish within our web of belief would then 
explain the possibility of alternative conceptual schemes. Setting the ontology of our 
theory will involve employing a conceptual scheme which individuates the objects we 
are positing. All languages that share an ontology with ours will embody the same 
conceptual scheme. And languages that do not share such an ontology must then 
embody an alternative conceptual scheme. So we will have evidence for conceptual 
difference if  we can determine that a language has ontological commitments different 
to our own, and if  we can do so without any appeal to translation.
Davidson’s general argument against this approach is that we cannot 
determine that a language has ontological commitments different from those o f our 
language without an appeal to translation. Investigation of the referential apparatus of 
any language requires a shared ontology between our own language and the language 
to be investigated. Thus ‘organisation’ will not serve as a relation between language 
and experience that can supply evidence for alternative schemes. Neither can we 
appeal to ‘fitting’ for such evidence, for to determine that a theory and its associated 
language(s) fits with experience, we must understand the concept o f truth as applied 
to those languages. But we cannot understand this concept without being able to 
translate the languages.
So, while Quine’s theories o f how language and experience relate may make 
intelligible the possibility of alternative schemes, it will not supply any evidence for 
there being alternative schemes.
^^See Tarski, “The Semantic Conception o f  Truth”, pp. 343-5, and “Truth and P ro o f’, p. 64.
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Having now considered Davidson’s attacks on both Kiilinian and Quinean 
attempts to defend the scheme-content dualism, we might ask what he intended to 
offer in its stead. This is the topic o f chapter 3.
Chapter 3
3.1. Introduction.
In “Two Dogmas” Quine not only attacks the empiricism of the Logical Positivists, 
but also offers an alternative “empiricism without dogmas”. In OVICS Davidson 
does not offer an alternative to the views he attacks. However, in other work he does 
offer such an alternative. Section 3.2 presents this non-empiricist alternative, 
concentrating on the paper “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge” . Section 
3.3 discusses troublesome issues concerning the justifiers o f belief, and presents 
Davidson’ s non-empiricist solution to these problems. However, in section 3.4 
Davidson’s solution will be found wanting, and thus his alternative to empiricism will 
be shown to be flawed.
3.2. Davidson’s Alternative.
Rejecting the Dogmas.
To understand Davidson’s alternative to dogmatic empiricism, it will help to first 
consider what work the dogmas o f empiricism do for the Positivists and for Quine. In 
both cases, what the dogmas do can be summed up as follows— they relate theory 
(language) and evidence (for the empiricist, experience). O f course, on the details of 
how theory and evidence are related the two methods are radically different. To treat 
o f these details then, I will take each method in turn.
First, the method of the Positivists, which has as its centrepiece the dogmas of 
reductionism— i.e. the dogma o f reductionism itself, and the reductionist reconstrual 
o f analyticity. As we have seen (in 1.3), the Positivists argued that the relation 
between theory and evidence is a logical one. All statements could be logically 
reduced to a set o f observation or protocol statements, which were in some way 
‘about’ sense experience.^ Experience serves as evidence, and specific statements are 
linked to confirming experiences via observation statements. To determine the 
empirical content o f any theoretical statement simply involved ‘reducing’ that
H here  was disagreement among the Positivists as to what form observation statements were to take. 
Nonetheless, these observation statements could be linked to other non-observational statements 
thi'ough the logical relation o f reductionism, and thus observation statements (whatever their form) 
served to link experience (i.e. evidence) to theory.
61
statement to a set of observation statements, and thus linking the original statement to 
a set o f confirming experiences.
Any theoretical statements that could not be linked in this way to experience 
were either (a) analytically true, or (b) meaningless. To tell which o f the two a 
particular non-reducible statement is will be simple. A statement is only analytically 
true if  it is true in virtue of logical laws, or could be reduced to a statement that is true 
in virtue o f logical laws. So all meaningful statements were either verified by 
reduction to observation statements, or true in virtue o f the laws o f logic.
Quine, as we know, rejected this reductionism, but since he wished to remain 
an empiricist he needed to explain the relation between theory and evidence in another 
way. Davidson’s claim is that he does so by appeal to the scheme-content dualism, 
which will itself turn out to be a dogma o f empiricism.^
I once wrote that Quine subscribed to what I called the dualism o f scheme and content, and I suggested 
that accepting this dualism constituted the third dogma o f empiricism. What I had in mind as the 
scheme was language, with its built-in ontology and theory o f the world, the content being supplied by 
the patterned firing o f  neurons.
(Davidson, “Meaning, Truth and Evidence”, p. 69.)
Empirical content is now linked with the objective physical events that occur at the 
sensory surfaces of the observer. Thus evidence now takes the form o f the observer’s 
linguistic responses to these physical events. So observation statements are no longer 
‘about’ private or public sense experiences, but are rather responses elicited by 
sensory stimulation. Nonetheless, experience (or sensoiy stimulation) is related to 
theory via observation statements, as it was with the Positivists. But because Quine 
has rejected reductionism, it is no longer clear how exactly we may determine the 
empirical content o f a theoretical statement, and thus determine what evidence there 
could be to support it.
As we saw in 1.3, Quine argues that “it is misleading to speak of the empirical 
content o f an individual statement” .^  Empirical content, he insists, cannot be 
allocated statement by statement, but only to theory as a whole. But how empirical 
content is to be distributed through a theory is underdetermined by experience (or 
sensory stimulation), so there are various possible options. In “Two Dogmas” we are 
told that we can decide between various options for distributing empirical content 
tlirough a theory by appealing to pragmatic considerations like simplicity and
^See Davidson, OVICS, pp. 189-95, “Meaning, Truth and Evidence”, p. 69, and “The Myth o f  the 
Subjective”, pp. 161-3.
^Quine, “Two Dogmas”, p. 43.
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conservation.4 What ontological commitments our theories have, and what sensory 
stimulations are taken to confirm or infirm theoretical statements are thus purely 
governed by pragmatic concerns.
The issue over there being classes seems more a question o f convenient conceptual scheme; the issue 
over there being centaurs, or brick houses on Elm Street, seems more a question o f  fact. But I have 
been urging that this difference is only one o f degree, and that it turns upon our vaguely pragmatic 
inclination to adjust one strand o f the fabric o f science rather than another in accommodating some 
particular recalcitrant experience.
(Quine, “Two Dogmas” , p. 46.)
And so theory is related to evidence according to how we act on certain pragmatic 
considerations. What sensory stimulation serves as evidence for is determined by 
what conceptual scheme, and thus what theory, we hold. The relation between theory 
and evidence then becomes a relation between scheme and content. Episteniology 
then becomes a psychological study o f how humans “deliver as output a description of 
the three-dimensional external world and its history” from the “meagre input” of 
certain neuron firings.5
Rejecting Empiricism.
In rejecting the above ‘dogmas’ then, one must also reject the relation between theory 
and evidence that they each propound. Thus, when Quine rejected the first two 
dogmas, he rejected the associated relation between theoiy and evidence, and offered 
a new one in its stead. It seems that any empiricist who wishes to attack Quine, and 
the third dogma o f empiricism, will have to do likewise. This, however, is not 
Davidson’s tactic. He tells us that the scheme-content dualism is not only the third, 
but “perhaps the last” dogma o f empiricism, “for if  we give it up it is not clear that 
there is anything distinctive left to call empiricism.”^
Whether he is justified in making this claim or not, it at least signals his intent 
not to offer a new ‘empiricism without dogmas’, but instead to tm*n his back on 
empiricism altogether, Empiricism comes in numerous forms, as Davidson is well 
aware, but he takes it that an empiricist is at least committed
not only to the pallid claim that all knowledge o f the world comes through the agency o f the senses, but 
also the conviction that this fact is o f prime epistemological significance. The pallid idea merely
^ibid., p. 46.
5Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized”, p. 83. 
^Davidson, OVICS, p. 189.
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recognizes the obvious causal role o f  the senses in mediating between objects and events in the world 
and our thoughts and talk about them; empiricism locates the ultimate evidence for those thoughts at 
this intermediate step.
(Davidson, “Meaning, Truth and Evidence”, pp. 68-9.)
It is this claim o f “epistemological significance” that Davidson is turning his back on. 
That is, he rejects the claim that experience can serve as evidence for theory, or, to put 
it another way, that the senses can justify beliefs.'^
Davidson’s attack on what he calls ‘the third dogma’ is one part o f his flight 
from empiricism. Those who hold to the scheme-content dualism are forced to deny 
any direct Imowledge o f what is the source of evidence— i.e. the world, nature, 
experience, sense data, the given etc. (see 2.2 above). Therefore, they are forced to 
produce a method for identifying conceptual difference that does not make use or 
reference to such direct knowledge. That is, the method they offer for identifying 
conceptual difference must not ‘interpret’ or schematise the source o f content, the 
common system on which all points o f view are plotted.^ But in order to demonstrate 
that different conceptual schemes give form to the same content, this method must 
still acknowledge this common system as the source of evidence. So, in Quine’s case 
for example, we are told that conceptual scheme ‘fits’ experience, that is it agrees 
with experience. But experience is not conceptualised, it is not ‘interpreted’— for 
observation statements are ''about physical objects and not sense experience”.^  
Experience never crosses the “peripheiy” o f theory, but as theory is forced to fit it, it 
still serves as the source o f evidence.
Davidson’s attack on the scheme-content dualism consists of arguments for 
the claim that the schemers’ various strategies for identifying conceptual difference 
without ‘interpreting’ the ‘common system’ all fail. If we accept these arguments (I 
have to some extent attempted to defend them in 2.2-2.4 above), then it seems we 
must reject the scheme-content dualism as a dogma o f empiricism. However, it is 
unclear why these arguments should force us to give up empiricism altogether. 
Davidson o f course contends that the third dogma o f empiricism is also the final 
dogma, but he does not spell out his reasons in OVICS. He does, however, offer a 
separate set o f reasons why any type o f empiricism will have problems explaining 
how senses are to justify belief.
How, then, might sensation justify belief?
^Davidson, “A Coherence Theory o f Truth and Knowledge” , p. 312. 
«Davidson, OVICS, p. 184.
9Quine, “Two Dogmas” , p. 43.
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The simplest idea is to identify certain beliefs with sensations. Thus Hume seems not to have 
distinguished between perceiving a green spot and perceiving that a spot is green.
(Davidson, “A Coherence Theory o f Truth and Knowledge”, p. 310.)
But beliefs have propositional content, and sensation does not— thus we cannot 
identify certain beliefs with sensations,
A more plausible approach, which avoids this problem, is to claim that we 
have beliefs about sensations— e.g. ‘I believe that this spot is green’— and that these 
beliefs, because o f their special character, require no justification. There is, 
however, at least one problem with this approach. That is, if  we had sensations 
without their associated self-justifying beliefs, we would not have justified belief.
Emphasis on sensation or perception in matters epistemological springs from the obvious thought: 
sensations are what connect the world and our beliefs, and they are candidates for justifiers because we 
are often aware o f them. The trouble ... is that the justification seems to depend on the awareness, 
which is ju st another belief.
(Davidson, “A Coherence Theory o f  Truth and Knowledge” , p. 311.)
What we have then is belief, and not sensation, justifying belief. ^  ‘
We have already seen what Davidson’s solution to these problems is going to 
be— reject the claim that the senses do justify beliefs. His alternative is not unlike the 
one just mentioned— i.e. that belief justifies belief.
D avidson’s Alternative.
In “A Coherence Theory o f Truth and Knowledge” Davidson argues for a form o f 
coherence theory o f knowledge.
My coherence theory concerns beliefs, or sentences held true by someone who understands them. ... 
Beliefs for m e are states o f people with intentions, desires, sense organs; they are states that are caused 
by, and cause, events inside and outside the bodies o f their entertainers. But even given all these 
constraints, there are many things people do believe, and many more that they could. For all such 
cases, the coherence theory applies.
(Davidson, "A Coherence Theory o f  Truth and Knowledge”, p. 308.)
Davidson claims that
•^Davidson gives an example o f one such approach, in “A Coherence Theory o f Truth and 
Knowledge” , p. 311.
^^ ibid., p. 311.
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there is a presumption in favor o f  the truth o f a belief that coheres with a significant mass o f  belief. 
Every belief in a coherent total set o f beliefs is justified in the light o f this presumption. ... This 
conclusion, though too vague and hasty to be right, contains an important core o f truth.
(Davidson, “A Coherence Theory o f Truth and Knowledge” , p. 308.)
Davidson attempts to build on this “core of truth” by appeal to the nature o f belief and 
belief attribution. We will see how this construction goes in the second half o f 3.3. 
But before that we must turn our attention to one o f the most difficult and pressing 
problems faced both by the empiricist, and by Davidson’ coherence theory of 
knowledge— that o f global scepticism.
3.3. The Sceptical Problem.
The Sceptical Problem.
W hat justifies the belief that our senses do not systematically deceive us? For even if  sensations justify 
belief in sensation, we do not yet see how they justify belief in external events and objects?
(Davidson, “A Coherence Theory o f Truth and Knowledge” , p. 311.)
The worry behind this question is an old one, most famously expressed by Descartes 
in the Meditations. The problem is that even if  the senses could serve as justifiers for 
belief in sensation, there is no guarantee that sensation resembles the external world 
that causes it. As Descartes pointed out, it is possible that our senses deceive us about 
the nature o f the external world. Our sensations o f green spots, of tables and chairs, 
or o f trees and animals may not be caused by green things, or tables, chairs, trees or 
animals but rather by an evil demon who is systematically trying to deceive us.'^ 
Whatever about the actual existence o f such a malicious being, the point Descartes is 
making is that our sensation could be exactly as it is (i.e. apparently of a world of 
chairs, trees, etc.), but the causes o f these sensations not be the external world as we 
take it to be represented tlu'ough the senses. We can’t see the evil demon, but it is him 
who is causing us to see chair and trees— therefore even if our senses were o f the 
correct form to justify oui' beliefs in sensations (whatever that form may be), they 
would still not serve to justify our beliefs about an objective external world.
This form o f scepticism about the external world is especially pressing for the 
empiricist, since she claims that much if  not all our Imowledge comes via the senses.
•^Descartes’ famous evil demon thesis is offered in the “First Meditation” .
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So, if  it is possible that the senses are lying to us, then it looks like we cannot justify 
any information that we receive from the senses. Thus while the senses may supply us 
with true belief, the sceptic has demonstrated that they will not justify the information 
they give us. And if  knowledge is justified true belief, then the senses do not supply 
us with knowledge. Even if the senses did not lie to us, the possibility that they may 
be caused by something other than what they represent (e.g. if  they were caused by 
evil demons or evil scientists) is enough to undermine their role as justifiers o f belief 
about the external world.
The sceptic’s questions do not cause the same problems for a coherence theoiy 
of knowledge, but this does not mean that the coherentist gets off scot-free. Rather, 
the sceptic’s questions simply raise different, but analogous problems for the 
coherentist. Since the coherentist denies that the senses justify any beliefs, whether 
they be about sensation or the causes o f sensation, she will not be worried by 
Descartes’ evil demon hypothesis. Since the senses do not justify her beliefs in chairs 
or tables etc., it will not concern her that her senses may be lying about chairs and 
tables. However, the sceptic may be just as worried about the coherentist’s method of 
justification as she is about the empiricist’s, albeit for different reasons.
The coherentist holds that “nothing can count as a reason [or justification] for 
holding a belief except another b e l i e f . ” *8 More specifically, she holds that a belief is 
justified if  it coheres with the overall set o f beliefs that it is a part of. The sceptic will 
argue that this method of justification is no better than the empiricist’s, because 
coherence no more guarantees the truth o f beliefs than do the senses. For on the 
coherentist view there is nothing stopping a person holding a coherent (i.e. non­
contradictory) set of beliefs, while those beliefs are largely false.
Davidson offers a way for the coherentist to proceed in the face o f such 
sceptical problems.
W hat we need to answer the skeptic is to show that someone with a (more or less) coherent set o f 
beliefs has a reason to suppose his beliefs are not mistaken in the main. What we have shown is that it 
is absurd to look for a justifying ground for the totality o f beliefs, something outside this totality which 
we can use to test or compare with our beliefs. The answer to our problems must then be to find a 
reason  for supposing most o f our beliefs are true that is not a form o f evidence.
(Davidson, “A Coherence Theory o f Truth and Knowledge”, p. 314.)
The problem with coherence is that in concerning itself purely with the internal 
workings of a set o f beliefs it seems to detach itself from the world. To claim that 
beliefs are true in virtue o f coherence seems wrongheaded. Beliefs should be true in
‘^Davidson, “A Coherence Theory o f Truth and Knowledge”, p. 310.
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virtue o f their agreeing with the world, or with the causes of belief. However, in 
OVICS and “A Coherence Theory o f Truth and Knowledge” Davidson has argued that 
any attempt to join belief to the world via some ‘uninterpreted content’ will fail. Thus 
he insists that any attempt to ‘rejoin’ beliefs and their causes must not make any 
appeal to the notion o f ‘uninterpreted content’ as a source o f evidence. Rather, the 
coherentist must find a reason for supposing that a coherent set o f beliefs is not 
largely mistaken that “is not a form o f evidence”. The rest o f 3.3 will outline 
Davidson’s attempt to give such a reason, and suggest that there is a problem with his 
approach.
D avidson’s Response to the Sceptic.
My argument has two parts. First 1 urge that a correct understanding o f the speech, beliefs, desires, 
intentions and other propositional attitudes o f  a person leads to the conclusion that most o f  a person’s 
beliefs must be true, and so there is a legitimate presumption that any one o f them, if  it coheres with 
most o f the rest, is true. Then I go on to claim that anyone with thoughts, and so in particular anyone 
who wonders whether he has any reason to suppose he is generally right about the nature o f  his 
environment, must know what a belief is, and how in general beliefs are to be detected and interpreted. 
These being perfectly general facts we cannot fail to use when we communicate with others, or when 
we try to communicate with others, or even when we merely thinlc we are communicating with others, 
there is a pretty strong sense in which we can be said to know that there is a presumption in favor o f the 
overall truthfulness o f anyone’s beliefs, including my own. So it is bootless for someone to ask for 
some fu rther  reassurance; that can only add to his stock o f beliefs. All that is needed is that he 
recognize that belief is in its nature veridical.
(Davidson, “A Coherence Theory o f Truth and ICnowledge” , p. 314.)
O f the two steps in this argument, I will concentrate on the first— i.e. “I urge that a 
correct understanding o f the speech, beliefs, desires, intentions and other propositional 
attitudes o f a person leads to the conclusion that most o f a person’s beliefs must be 
true, and so there is a legitimate presumption that any one o f them, if  it coheres with 
most o f the rest, is true.” It is with this claim that Davidson attempts to establish the 
“reason” that is not “evidence”.
Davidson’s views on what is involved in the “correct understanding” o f the 
speech and propositional attitudes of a person are spelt out in his work on ‘radical 
interpretation’. How exactly the conclusion that “most of a person’s beliefs must be 
true” follows from his views on radical interpretation is what will concern us in the 
next (quite a) few pages.
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Radical Interpretation and the Sceptic.
In his work on radical interpretation Davidson is primarily concerned with 
certain characteristics or abilities that a theory o f meaning (interpretation) must have. 
He sums up these characteristics in the “Introduction” to Inquiries into Truth and  
Interpretation:
W hat is it for words to mean what they do? In the essays collected here I explore the idea that we 
would have an answer to this question if  we knew how to construct a theory satisfying two demands: it 
would provide an interpretation o f all utterances, actual and potential, o f a speaker or group o f 
speakers; and it would be verifiable without knowledge o f the detailed propositional attitudes o f the 
speaker.
(Davidson, “Introduction”, p. xiii.)
The first demand or constraint on a theory of meaning can be further 
developed by recognition o f two fairly obvious features of languages— first, that they 
are learnable, and second that an infinite amount o f novel sentences could be 
constructed in most languages. Taking these two features together suggests that “a 
satisfactory theoiy must discover a finite basic vocabulary in the verbal phenomena to 
be interpreted if  it is to prove useful to a creature with finite powers.” 4^ Languages 
(or at least most) ‘contain’ an infinite amount o f sentences. However, for a “creature 
with finite powers” to be able to learn such languages, she cannot learn the meaning 
o f each sentence one by one. Rather, she must learn a finite vocabulary and a 
grammar (i.e. rules for constructing sentences by joining together words from this 
finite vocabulary). Thus, a theory o f meaning must be able to explain how “the 
semantic features of the potential infinity o f sentences” are owed “to the semantic 
features o f the items in a finite vocabulary”. • 5
So, not only must a theory o f meaning provide “an interpretation o f all 
utterances, actual and potential, of a speaker or group of speakers”, but these 
interpretations must result from an investigation o f the semantic features o f the ‘parts’ 
o f the interpreted sentences. That is, the theory o f meaning must explain how the 
meaning o f sentences depends on the meaning o f their parts (whatever ‘meaning’ 
signifies here).
Davidson applauds Frege’s attempt to meet this constraint by giving a 
recursive account of how the meaning o f sentences depends on the meaning o f their
•4Davidson, “Introduction”, in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, p. xiii. See also “Theories o f 
M eaning and Learnable Languages” , in the same volume, pp. 3-15, and “Truth and M eaning”, p. 17. 
•^Davidson, “Introduction” , p. xiii.
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parts. Frege’s insight was to realise that “a satisfactory theoiy o f the meanings o f 
complex expressions may not require entities as meanings of all the parts” o f those 
expressions. Rather, a theory could be constructed in which sub-sentential terms 
like predicates (for example) were not thought to refer to an entity, but rather serve a 
functional role in sentences. It could be said that these functions map the entities 
referred to by names onto other entities. Taking Frege’s insight into consideration, 
then, the first constraint on a theoiy of meaning can be rephrased “so as not to suggest 
that individual words must have meanings at all, in any sense that transcends the fact 
that they have a systematic effect on the meanings o f the sentences in which they
occur. ” 18
There is, however, a problem with the recursive Fregean theory as it is 
presented above. In this theory, names refer to objects or entities, and other sub- 
sentential parts map these entities onto other entities. The meaning o f names is then 
identified with their reference. But, as Frege was aware, reference and meaning do 
not always coincide. The famous Fregean example is o f the two names ‘Morning 
Star’ and ‘Evening Star’. Both refer to the same entity (i.e. Venus), but they clearly 
do not have the same meaning. As a result, sentences that contain them do not have 
the same meaning. For example, the sentence
(1) Morning Star = Evening Star 
does not mean the same as
(2) Morning Star = Morning Star.
Frege’s solution to this problem was to introduce a distinction between sense 
(meaning) and reference. However, Davidson insists at this point that
the switch from reference to meaning leads to no useful account o f how the meanings o f  sentences 
depend upon the meanings o f the words (or other structural features) that compose them.
(Davidson, “Truth and M eaning”, p. 20.)
The problem is that Frege’s insight is lost. According to Davidson, on the 
introduction o f sense as opposed to reference, Frege’s account o f how the meaning of 
a sentence depends on the meaning of its parts becomes a bogus one.
•^Davidson, “Truth and M eaning”, pp. 17-20.
p. 18.
•8/Z/y,,p. 18.
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Ask, for example, for the meaning o f ‘Theaetetus flies’. A Fregean answer might go something like 
this; given the meaning o f ‘Theatetus’ as argument, the meaning o f ‘flies’ yields the meaning o f 
‘Theaetetus flies’ as value. The vacuity o f this answer is obvious. We wanted to know what the 
meaning o f ‘Theaetetus flies’ is; it is no progress to be told that it is the meaning o f ‘Theatetus flies’. 
This much we knew before any theory was in sight. In the bogus account just given, talk o f the 
structure o f the sentence and o f the meanings o f words was idle, for it played no role in producing the 
given description o f the meaning o f  the sentence.
(Davidson, “Truth and Meaning” , p. 20.)
A real account would consist in
a theoiy that has as consequences all sentences o f  the form "s means w ’ where 's ' is replaced by a 
structural description o f a sentence and ‘w ’ is replaced by a singular term that refers to the meaning o f 
that sentence; ... [moreover, this theory must provide] an effective method for arriving at the meaning 
o f an arbitrary sentence structurally described.
(Davidson, “Truth and M eaning” , p. 20.)
Whether Davidson’s criticisms o f Frege are fair is not to the point hered^ What is 
important is that, in the above quote, Davidson is beginning to outline what he 
believes is a satisfactory theory o f meaning.^o
However, Davidson is unhappy with the above formulation of a theory of 
meaning for the same reason he is unhappy with the Fregean theory he initially 
criticises. A theoiy that yields sentences of the form "s means m’ will be 
uninformative as to how the parts of a sentence influence the meaning. Davidson 
suggests that a theory that yields sentences o f the form ‘5- means m \  where is 
replaced by a structural description o f the ‘meanings’ of the paits o f a sentence, and 
‘/M’ refers to the meaning o f the sentence will be trivial. The problem with the 
Fregean accoimt generalises to all theories that take meanings as entities. To be told 
that the meaning of ‘Theatetus flies’ is ‘Theatetus flies’ is to be told nothing new, and 
the reference to the structure o f the sentence is merely bogus hand waving.
If  meanings are not to be entities, then our theory should not have as a 
consequence sentences of the form ‘j- means m \  Now that we do not accept meanings 
as entities, the singular term ‘m’ must go. Davidson initially suggests replacing ‘j  
means m" with ‘5 means thatp \  where is to be replaced by a sentence, but quickly 
discards this because “it is reasonable to expect that in wrestling with the logic o f the 
apparently non-extensional ‘means that’ we will encounter problems as hard as, or
•^This sentence, not unintentionally, suggests that D avidson’s criticisms may not be fair.
20por another Davidsonian attack on meanings as entities, see “Radical Interpretation”, p. 126-7.
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perhaps identical with, the problems our theoiy is out to solve.’’^  ^ Davidson finally 
settles on what he calls a “simple and radical” solution^^
The theory [of meaning] will have done its work if it provides, for every sentence s in the language 
under study, a matching sentence (to replace 'p ')  that, in some way yet to be made clear, ‘gives the 
m eaning’ o f s. One obvious candidate for this matching sentence is just s itself, if  the object language 
is contained in the metalanguage; otherwise a translation o f s in the metalanguage. As a final bold step, 
let us try treating the position occupied by 'p ' extensionally: to implement this, sweep away the obscure 
‘means that’, provide the sentence that replaces 'p ' with a proper sentential connective, and supply the 
description that replaces ‘f ’ with its own predicate. The plausible result is
(T) j  is T if and only if p.
(Davidson, “Truth and M eaning”, p. 23.)
The constraint that is to be met by a theory o f meaning now is that it must entail a 
sentence o f the form (T) for every sentence in the language to be interpreted. It is 
claimed that this will yield an interpretation, since the sentence taking the place o f ‘p ’ 
in some way ‘gives the meaning o f  the sentence structurally described in the position 
o f j. Davidson points out that this condition “is in essence Tarski’s Convention T that 
tests the adequacy of a formal semantical definition of truth”, and thus “the sentences 
to which the predicate ‘is T  applies will be just the true sentences o f Z” where L is the 
language for which we are constructing a theory o f m e a n in g .^ ^
Convention T is Tarski’s material adequacy condition for any theory of truth. 
That is, any acceptable definition or theory o f truth must have as consequence all 
instances o f the (T) schema. The idea behind this adequacy condition is that the truth 
o f the (T) schema is so certain and obvious that it is proper that one should feel 
confident in rejecting any definition or theory o f truth which is inconsistent with it. 
Remember that for a sentence s, the (T) schema takes a structural description o f j  on 
its left hand side, and j- itself on its right hand side. So, taking the famous example of 
‘snow is white’, a satisfactory theory o f truth for English must have as a consequence 
the T-sentence
‘Snow is white’ is true if  and only if  snow is white.
Davidson, “Truth and Meaning”, p. 22.
22/6/c/., p. 22.
23/6/c/ ,  p. 23. See also “Radical Interpretation”, pp. 130-1, 133-4.
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Now it should be clear why the truth o f the (T) schema is certain and o b v i o u s , 24
For Tarski it was relatively straight-forward to check whether a theory o f truth 
met this material adequacy condition. To check whether a certain T-sentence was true 
(i.e. whether both its left and right sides had the same truth value), one had only to 
ensure that the sentence on the right side o f the bi-conditional was also the sentence 
named on the left side. In the above case we have a true bi-conditional because the 
right side is the sentence ‘snow is white’, and this sentence is named on the left hand 
side. But what about a sentence like
‘Sclmee ist weil3’ is true-in-Gernian if  and only if  snow is white.
Things are no longer so straightforward. The T-sentence is in English, but the truth 
theoiy is for German. So an English speaker could understand the T-sentence without 
knowing its truth value. Tarski solves this problem by insisting that the language in 
which a theory o f truth is formulated must either (a) contain the expressions o f the 
language for which we are constructing a theory, or (b) contain translations o f the 
expressions o f the language we are constructing the theoiy for.25 go, in the above 
case, the language o f the theory would not be English, but English plus a ‘translation 
manual’ o f German expressions. Using this translation manual, one will learn that 
‘snow is white’ translates ‘Schnee ist weiB’, and therefore the T-sentence is true.
However, this solution is not open to Davidson, since he wishes to use 
Tarski’s material adequacy condition as a condition for a satisfactory theory of 
meaning, and not just tmth. And it is clear that such a theory cannot presuppose 
translations o f a language for which is to supply interpretations. If it did so, it would 
be presupposing its own conclusions.
In Tarski’s work, T-sentences are taken to be true because the right branch o f the biconditional is 
assumed to be a translation o f the sentence truth conditions for which are being given. But we cannot 
assume in advance that correct translation can be recognized without pre-empting the point o f radical 
interpretation; in empirical applications, we must abandon the assumption. What I propose is to reverse 
the direction o f explanation: assuming translation, Tarski was able to define truth; the present idea is to 
take truth as basic and to extract an account o f translation or interpretation.
(Davidson, “Radical Interpretation”, p. 134.)
24see Tarski, “The Semantic Conception o f  Truth”, pp. 343-5, “Truth and P ro o f’, p. 64, “The Concept 
o f  Truth in Formalized Languages” , pp. 154-7, 186-8. See also Haack, Philosophy o f  Logics, pp. 100- 
3.
23Tarski, “The Semantic Conception o f Truth” , pp. 349-51.
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With this “reverse o f direction” comes the second constraint on a satisfactory theory 
o f meaning.
The constraint was that the theory “would be verifiable without knowledge o f 
the detailed prepositional attitudes o f the speaker.”26 It now turns out that this 
constraint is a special instance of a more general one— i.e. that it must be possible to 
tell that a theory of meaning is correct (i.e. that its T-sentences are true) without any 
appeal to translation. Or, as Davidson him self puts it, a theory o f meaning must be 
verifiable “on the basis of evidence plausibly available to an interpreter with no prior 
knowledge o f the language to be interpreted”.2? Detailed laiowledge o f the 
propositional attitudes o f a speaker cannot serve as evidence by which one might 
verify a theory o f meaning because “attribution o f attitudes, at least where subtlety is 
required, demand a theory that must rest on much the same evidence as 
interpretation.”28 This Davidson refers to as the ‘interdependence o f belief and 
meaning’. The idea is simply that in attributing propositional attitudes like beliefs to a 
person, we listen to what she says, and especially to what we take to be her sincere 
assertions.
Davidson’s explanation o f how a theory o f meaning is to meet this second 
constraint has already been intimated by the claim to ‘reverse’ the direction of 
explanation o f a Tarskian theory o f truth by discai’ding the assumption that we can 
translate the language we are constructing a theory for. Convention-T is now 
reformulated as follows:
an acceptable theory o f  truth must entail, for every sentence s  o f the object language, a sentence o f  the 
form: s is true if  and only ifp , where 'p ' is replaced by any sentence that is true if and only if s is.
Given this formulation, the theory is tested by evidence that T-sentences are simply true; we have given 
up the idea that we must also tell whether what replaces 'p ' translates s.
(Davidson, “Radical Interpretation” , p. 134.)
Two obvious worries come to mind. First, how are we to tell that a T-sentence is true 
if  we do not know that the sentence named on the left side of the bi-conditional serves 
as the right side o f the bi-conditional? While is seems obvious that sentences o f the 
form
‘j"’ is true if  and only if  j
are true, it is not so obvious for sentences o f the form
26Davidson, “Introduction”, in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, p. xiii. 
22Davidson, “Radical Interpretation” , p. 131.
^ i^bid, p. 134.
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's’ is true if and only if p.
The second, and more pressing worry, is that even if  we could determine 
whether the T-sentences were true, it seems “that there is no chance that if  we demand 
so little o f T-sentences, a theory o f inteipretation will e m e r g e . ” 2 9  An example will 
serve to illustrate the problem. On Davidson’s reformulation o f Convention-T, the 
following would serve as an acceptable T-sentence for ‘snow is white’:
(1) ‘Snow is white’ is true if  and only if  grass is green.
But it is clear that ‘grass is green’ does not give the meaning o f ‘snow is white’, and 
thus the true T-sentence for ‘snow is white’ does not give an interpretation o f ‘snow is 
white’.
These problems arose from not presupposing translation, and now the solution 
to these problems is to come from taking truth as basic. According to Davidson, the 
advantage of taking truth as basic is that “ [tjruth is a single property which attaches, 
o f fails to attach, to utterances, while each utterance has its own interpretation; and 
truth is more apt to connect with fairly simple attitudes of s p e a k e r s ” .3o Taking truth 
as basic then should explain not only what utterances mean, but should also give some 
insight into the propositional attitudes of speakers. Thi'ough assigning truth 
conditions to sentences, we are to learn what they mean, and by taking propositional 
attitudes as attitudes towards the tm th o f particular sentences, we are to attribute 
beliefs, desires, etc. For example, we can explain belief in terms o f holding true. If a 
speaker believes thatp, then he must hold the sentence p  to be true.
As we have seen, Davidson argues belief and meaning are interdependent, and 
thus we camiot assume any detailed knowledge about one in an explanation o f the 
other. But truth can explain both meaning (truth conditions) and belief (holding true). 
Thus a truth theory that allows us to compare sentences held true with the truth 
conditions o f those sentences will be both a satisfactory theory of meaning and of 
belief. Davidson’s development o f Tarski will bring us some o f the way to getting the 
truth conditions o f sentences (more on getting the rest o f the way later). Holding true
is, o f course, a belief, but it is a single attitude applicable to all sentences, and so does not ask us to be 
able to make finely discriminated distinctions among beliefs. It is an attitude an interpreter may
2^/6/c/., p. 134. 
^^ibid., p. 134.
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plausibly be taken to be able to identify before he can interpret, since he may know that a person 
intends to express a truth in uttering a sentences without having any idea what truth.
(Davidson, “Radical Interpretation”, p. 135.)
The comparison takes place when holding true is taken as evidence for the truth o fT - 
sentences. Thus for a T-sentence;
(T) ‘es regnef is true-in-German when spoken by % at time t if and only if  it is raining 
near x at
we may offer evidence o f the form:
(E) Kurt belongs to the German speech community^i and Kurt holds true ‘Es regnef 
on Saturday at noon and it is raining near Kurt on Saturday at noon.32
As Davidson admits in numerous places, this approach closely resembles 
Quine’s ‘radical translation’.33 Quine explained that translation was possible in a 
radical situation (i.e. where the translator knew nothing about the language to be 
translated) if  the translator compared the verbal behaviour of speakers with their 
sensory stimuli.34 Translation began then by determining which sensory stimuli elicit 
the utterances o f which native sentences, and mapping those sentences onto sentences 
in the home language which are elicited by the same sensory stimuli.
Davidson’s approach is not the same as Quine’s, but the parallels are 
suggestive of how to understand Davidson’s approach. Instead o f verbal behaviour 
and sensoiy stimuli, Davidson compares sentences held true by speakers o f the 
language to be interpreted with the conditions under which those sentences are held 
true. Knowing the conditions under which a speaker holds a sentence to be true, we 
can then link 5 with a sentence in our own language held true under the same 
circumstances.35 So, when our theory o f meaning gives the T-sentence;
31 “The appeal to a speech community cuts a com er but begs no question: speakers belong to the same 
speech community if the same theories o f  interpretation work for them.” Davidson, “ Radical 
Interpretation”, p. 135.
32Both (T) and (E) are taken from Davidson, op. cit., p. 135.
33see for example, Davidson, “Truth and M eaning” , p. 27, n. 12, p. 35, n. 19, and “Radical 
Interpretation” , p. 126, n .l, p. 136, n. 16.
34Quine, Word and Object, pp. 28ff.
33“ W hat he [the interpreter] must do is find out, however he can, what sentences the alien holds true in 
his own tongue (or better, to what degree he holds them true). The linguist then will attempt to 
construct a characterization o f truth-for-the-alien which yields, so far as possible, a mapping o f 
sentences held true (or false) by the alien on to sentences held true (or false) by the linguist.” 
Davidson, “Truth and M eaning”, p. 27. See also (for example) “Radical Interpretation” , pp. 134-5, 
“B elief and the Basis o f  M eaning” , pp. 142, 152, “Thought and Talk”, pp. 161-2, 168, and “A 
Coherence Theoiy o f Truth and Knowledge”, p. 315.
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(T) ‘es regnef is true-in-German when spoken by x at time t if  and only if  it is raining 
near x at t.
it offers us ‘it is raining’ as an interpretation o f ‘es regnet’. It speaks in favour o f this 
interpretation if  various German speakers hold ‘es regnef true under the same 
circumstances that we hold ‘it is raining’ true— i.e. when it is raining near the speaker 
at the time o f utterance. Thus
(E) Kurt belongs to the German speech community and Kurt holds true ‘Es regnef on 
Saturday at noon and it is raining near Kurt on Saturday at noon.
serves as evidence for the truth of (T).
There is, however, a problem with Davidson’s approach. As he puts it 
himself, “Kurt, or anyone else, may be wrong about whether it is raining near him.”36 
If Kurt is wrong about whether it is raining near him (i.e. if  he has a false belief), then 
he will not hold ‘es regnef true under all and only the circumstances that we hold ‘it 
is raining’ true. This will undermine the role o f holding true as evidence for the truth 
of the T-sentences o f a theory o f meaning for, in this case, German. To generalise the 
point, if  the speakers of the language to be interpreted could be wrong on a regular 
basis (i.e. if  they had many false beliefs), then holding true does not guarantee the 
truth o f T-sentences. For Davidson to retain holding tiaie as evidence, then, he must 
show why speakers of any language could not have mostly false beliefs.
The last sentence is actually not quite right, as Davidson is quick to point 
out.37 Davidson does not have to demonstrate that Kurt’s beliefs are not mostly false, 
but only that his beliefs mostly agree with the i n t e r p r e t e r ’s.^s The problem raised by 
the possibility that Kurt had mostly false beliefs was that he would not hold sentences 
true under the right circumstances. But to ensure generally correct understanding o f 
Kurt’s words, what is needed is that he holds most sentences true under more or less 
the same conditions as the interpreter. It does not matter that his beliefs are mostly 
false, as long as they are false in the same way as the interpreter’s. As long as the 
interpreter and Kurt are usually in agreement, then they will hold largely the same
36Davidson, “Radical Interpretation”, p. 136.
32/6W., pp. 136-7.
3^That Kurt agrees with his interpreter does not mean that he must have all and only the beliefs the 
interpreter has. It is obvious that Kurt will not have had all the experiences o f the interpreter (and vice 
versa), and thus it will be impossible for them to have exactly the same beliefs. D avidson’s idea rather 
is to interpret Kurt as having the same beliefs as the interpreter “when plausibly possible” {ibid., p. 
137.)
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sentences true under the same circumstances, and so holding true will serve as 
evidence for the truth o f the T-sentences o f the interpreter’s theory o f meaning.
This assumption o f agreement is usually referred to as ‘the Principle o f 
Charity’, although, ironically enough, it is not at all a charitable assumption.
The methodological advice to interpret in a way that optimizes agreement should not be conceived as 
resting on a charitable assumption about human intelligence that might turn out to be false. If  we 
camiot find a way to interpret the utterances and other behaviour o f a creature as revealing a set o f 
beliefs largely consistent and true by our own standards, we have no reason to count that creature as 
rational, as having beliefs, or as saying anything.
(Davidson, “Radical Interpretation” , p. 137.)
The point being that without an assumption o f agreement, interpretation itself will be 
impossible. Davidson has argued that a theory of meaning must not presuppose 
translation, nor any detailed knowledge of the beliefs and other propositional attitudes 
o f the speakers o f the language to be interpreted. Translation was not to be 
presupposed for obvious reasons, and beliefs etc. were not to be supposed because it 
was claimed that detailed attribution o f beliefs would rest on much the same evidence 
as interpretation of speech behaviour. To break into the circle o f meaning and belief 
then, and thus be able to attribute beliefs and meanings to a speaker at all, one must 
“hold belief constant as far as possible while solving for m e a n i n g ” .^^ The reason, 
then, that the Principle o f Charity is a methodological necessity is that without it 
attribution o f belief would be wholly impossible. And “since charity is not an option, 
but a condition of having a workable theory, it is meaningless to suggest that we 
might fall into massive error by endorsing it.”40
Thus Davidson’s claim that “correct understanding” o f speech, belief and 
other propositional attitudes leads to the conclusion that most o f a person’s beliefs 
must be true. The fact is, according to Davidson, that if  one thought otherwise it 
would be impossible to attribute belief at all.
It has been a long haul from the initial stating of Davidson’s argument against 
the sceptic to our present position, and it is hoped that initial statement now makes 
some more sense in the light o f the journey. Therefore, it will be useful to sum up 
what we have learnt from the journey.
p. 137.
40Davidson, OVICS, p. 197.
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Summary.
We began with Davidson’s claim that a theory o f meaning must meet two basic 
constraints for it to be a correct theory. The first was that it must yield an 
interpretation of every sentence (actual and possible) in the language with which the 
theory is concerned. Davidson argues that such a theory will turn out to have the form 
o f a Tarskian theory o f truth, which yields a T-sentence for every sentence in the 
language the theory is for. These T-sentences are to give the interpretations o f the 
sentences o f the object language.
There were some problems with testing whether T-sentences did give correct 
interpretations, because while Tarski could presuppose translation in order to check 
the truth of T-sentences, an interpreter could not do so without presupposing 
interpretation itself. This was the second constraint on theories of meaning— they 
must not presuppose any knowledge about the language for which they are a theory. 
For associated reasons, they could not presuppose any detailed knowledge o f the 
beliefs or other propositional attitudes o f speakers o f the language which the theory 
was for.
Davidson’s solution was to reformulate Convention-T in such a way as not to 
presuppose translation. Now it reads
an acceptable theory o f truth must entail, for every sentence s o f  the object language, a sentence o f the 
form: s is true if  and only if p, where 'p ' is replaced by any sentence that is true if and only if  j  is.
(Davidson, “Radical Interpretation” , p. 134.)
The problem with this reformulation was that Convention-T now did not guarantee 
that a true T-sentence for a sentence s  would yield an interpretation for s. That is, 
while 'p ’ would have the same truth value as ‘j"’ if  the T-sentence were true, it did not 
need to have the same meaning.
To ensure that his reformulated Convention-T did yield interpretations, then, 
Davidson decided to “reverse the direction of explanation” in Tarski’s account, and 
take truth as basic in order to extract an account o f translation. Taking hints from 
Quine’s work on radical translation, Davidson proposed to use Convention-T to 
explore under what conditions speakers o f the language to be interpreted held certain 
sentences true. The theory of truth for the object language was to entail T-sentences 
which gave the truth conditions, and hence the meaning of the aliens’ sentences. The 
truth o f the T-sentences was to be checked by the above mentioned investigation of 
the conditions under which alien sentences were held ti'ue. When an alien held a 
sentence 6" true under the conditions assigned to that sentence by the theory as truth 
conditions, this was counted as evidence in favour o f the theory.
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However, another problem ai'ose. If the aliens were not interpreted as having 
mostly true beliefs by the lights o f  the interpreter, then sentences held true would 
undermine rather than support the theory o f meaning. For example, the interpreter 
might construct a theoiy which entailed
(T) ‘es regnef is true-in-German when uttered by x at time t if  and only if  it is raining 
near x at L
If Kurt, our representative German speaker, did indeed mean ‘it is raining’ by ‘es 
regnef, but he did not believe it to be raining when the interpreter did, then the 
evidence on which a theory was to be built would systematically mislead the 
interpreter. Davidson’s solution was to insist that the interpreter must interpret the 
speaker as being in agreement with him concerning belief, or sentences held true, in 
most cases. Creating this Principle o f Charity was justified because without it, the 
inteipreter could never break into the circle o f belief and meaning, and thus 
interpretation would never get off the ground in the first place. It was concluded, 
then, that “a correct understanding o f the speech, beliefs, desire, intentions and other 
propositional attitudes o f a person leads to the conclusion that most o f a person’s 
beliefs must be true”, by the interpreter’s lights
Returning to Davidson original argument, it looks now as if  it falls somewhat 
short. The argument was:
a correct understanding o f  the speech [etc.] ... o f  a person leads to the conclusion that most o f a 
person’s beliefs must be true, and so there is a legitimate presumption that any one o f  them, if it coheres 
with m ost o f the rest, is true.
(Davidson, “A Coherence Theory o f Truth and Knowledge” , p. 314.)
But all that Radical Interpretation shows is that a correct understanding o f the speech 
o f a person leads to the conclusion that most o f a person’s beliefs agree with the 
interpreter’s. Since the sceptic can still insist that the interpreter could have mostly 
false beliefs, then it does not follow that “there is a legitimate presumption that any 
one [belief] ... , if  it coheres with most of the rest, is true.” Therefore, it seems that 
Davidson has been no more successful in responding to the sceptic than the 
empiricists whose views he rejects. However, in the next section I will argue that 
Davidson’s rejection of Empiricism in OVICS might come to his aid against the 
sceptic.
4) Davidson, “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge”, p. 314.
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3.4. The Reason that is not Evidence.
The Omniscient Interpreter.
Davidson him self recognises that the Principle of Charity is not enough to defend his 
coherence theory o f laiowledge against global scepticism.
It is an artefact o f the interpreter’s correct interpretation o f  a person’s speech and attitudes that there is 
a large degree o f truth and consistency in the thought and speech o f an agent. But this is truth and 
consistency by the interpreter’s standards. W hy couldn’t it happen that speaker and interpreter 
understand one another on the basis o f a shared but erroneous beliefs?
(Davidson, “A Coherence Theory o f Truth and Knowledge” , p. 317.)
Davidson admits that this can, and probably often does happen. But he argues that “it 
cannot be the m le”.42 To demonstrate why not, Davidson offers the ‘Omniscient 
Interpreter Argument’.
[I]magine for a moment an interpreter who is omniscient about the world, and about what does and 
would cause a speaker to assent to any sentence in his (potentially unlimited) repertoire. The 
omniscient interpreter, using the same method as the fallible interpreter, finds the fallible speaker 
largely consistent and correct. By his own standards, o f  course, but since these are objectively correct, 
the fallible speaker is seen to be largely correct and consistent by objective standards. We may also, if 
we want, let the omniscient interpreter turn his attention to the fallible interpreter o f  the fallible speaker. 
It turns out that the fallible interpreter can be wrong about some things, but not in general; and so he 
cannot share universal error with the agent he is interpreting. Once we agree to the general method o f 
interpretation I have sketched, it becomes impossible correctly to hold that anyone could be mostly 
wrong about how things are.
(Davidson, “A Coherence Theory o f Truth and Knowledge”, p. 317.)
[I]t is plain why massive error about the world is simply unintelligible, for to suppose it intelligible is to 
suppose there could be an interpreter (the onmiscient one) who correctly interpreted someone else as 
being massively mistaken, and this we have shown to be impossible.
(Davidson, “The Method o f Truth in Metaphysics”, p. 201.)
It is impossible “correctly to hold that anyone could be mostly wrong about 
how things are.” As we have already seen, the Principle of Charity demands that 
every interpreter interpret speakers as having mostly true belief, by the interpreter's
42Davidson, “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge”, p. 317.
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lights. So it follows that no interpreter can (correctly or otherwise) hold that any 
person she interprets could be in massive error about things. Our worry was the ‘by 
my lights’ subclause. If the interpreter is wrong, then it seems that the Principle of 
Charity will lead her to pass on her mistakes to those she interprets. And if she is 
massively in error, she will make those she interprets massively wrong too. Of 
course, the interpreter thinks she is largely right about the world, and thus she takes 
others to be largely right about the world— but she is, in fact, largely wrong.
The obvious answer to this problem is that since no one can be interpreted as 
having mostly false beliefs, then it clearly follows that no one can be interpreted as 
interpreting using mostly false beliefs.
W e may also, if  we want, let the omniscient interpreter turn his attention to the fallible interpreter o f  the 
fallible speaker. It turns out that the fallible interpreter [like everyone else] can be wrong about some 
things, but not in general; and so camiot share universal error with the agent he is interpreting.
(Davidson, “A Coherence Theory o f Truth and Knowledge” , p. 317.)
We have finally arrived at Davidson’s "reason ... that is not a form of 
evidence The method of correct understanding of the speech and beliefs o f a 
person (i.e. Radical Interpretation) demands that we all take the beliefs o f others as 
being mostly true. And not only this, when others interpret us, they must do the same 
(to realise this will be as important as to realise that massive error is unintelligible—  
more o f this later). The reason Davidson needs in support o f his coherence theory is 
that as interpreters are aware (we know) that massive error is thus unintelligible.
That we do Icnow this is argued for by Davidson as follows;
[A]nyone with thoughts, and so in particular anyone who wonders whether he has any reason to 
suppose he is generally right about the nature o f his environment, must know what a belief is, and how 
in general beliefs are to be detected and interpreted.
(Davidson, "A Coherence Theory o f Truth and Knowledge” , p. 314.)
And if  he knows what a belief is, and how they are attributed, detected and 
interpreted, then he must know that attribution o f mostly false beliefs to anyone is 
unintelligible. Thus he has reason not only to think that a belief that coheres with a 
large set of beliefs is likely to be true, but also that this reason will serve as a justifier 
for taking most o f the beliefs in such a system o f beliefs to be true. Thus the fact that 
his own belief system is coherent serves as justification for taking most o f those 
beliefs to be true. O f course, some o f his beliefs will (most likely) be false, but the
p. 314.
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fact that “there is a presumption in favor o f the truth of a belief that coheres with a 
significant mass of belief ’ justifies, to an extent, every belief in that total set of 
b e l i e f s .44 The extent to which beliefs are justified by this fact is determined by the 
way believers deal with the disagreements they have with other interpreters. To 
understand this a little better, we can return to a point made earlier concerning the 
importance o f how others interpret us.
Imagine a community which comprises o f three speakers / believers / 
interpreters— call them T, I2 and I3 . Each interpreter Icnows all about Davidson and 
his Principle o f Charity, and thus takes the coherence o f her beliefs as justification of 
their truth. Imagine then that Ii and I2 both interpret I3 . Could it be possible, with all 
we have seen so far, that 1% could attribute to I3 a system of beliefs that was radically 
different than the system o f beliefs I2 attributes to I3? Initially, it might seem so, since 
both interpreters could apply the Principle o f Charity, and thus interpret I3 as agreeing 
with them, while they themselves held radically different sets of beliefs. I f  this were 
so, it looks like the inteipreter’s beliefs are not justified by his laiowledge of radical 
interpretation.
However, it can be demonstrated that by appeal to the omniscient interpreter 
argument that such differences in attribution are unintelligible. It is impossible for 
any interpreter in our community to make intelligible the possibility that another 
interpreter could be interpreting the third member of the community in a radically 
different way. Thus an interpreter is not only justified in thinking that those he 
interprets as having coherent sets o f beliefs have mostly true beliefs by his lights and 
that since massive error is impossible, so his own beliefs must be mostly true, but also 
in thinking that other interpreters will interpret him and all other members of the 
interpretation community correctly. O f course, there will be disagreement between 
interpreters over the truth of particular beliefs, and through interpretation these 
disagreements can be understood and discussed. But the common method of 
interpretation makes radical difference o f belief impossible between interpreters.
The unintelligibility o f such radical difference speaks for Davidson’s 
coherence theory as an alternative to the scheme-content dualism, and its reliance on 
uninterpreted content. Davidson argued, as we saw in 2 .2 , that those who hold to the 
scheme-content dualism must make sense of conceptual relativism. It was then 
argued (see 2.4) that this was impossible. The unintelligibility of radical difference 
demonstrates that Davidson’s alternative to the scheme-content dualism does not have 
to make conceptual relativism intelligible, which he argues is an impossible task. 
Moreover, our community of interpreters demonstrates another advantage o f 
Davidson’s alternative over the scheme-content dualism.
44/6f(/., p. 308.
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The schemer had to make sense of the notion of uninterpreted content— a 
soui'ce o f evidence which could not itself be evidence. This, Davidson argued, was 
impossible, and the reason why conceptual relativism was a impossible position. But 
what our interpreters share in common is not some iminterpreted content, but “the 
familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions true or false.” 45 These 
objects and the relations between them serve both as the truth conditions for 
sentences, and the objects o f our beliefs. Interpreters largely agree on how the world 
is, i.e. since they interpret each other as having mostly true beliefs, and thus share by 
and large the same objects o f belief. Their shared beliefs supply them with the 
common world in which they interpret one another. Again, they may differ over 
certain details, but it is the fact that they share a commitment generally to the familiar 
objects that their sentences and beliefs are about that allows this disagreement without 
demanding conceptual relativism and all its problems.
It seems that Davidson’s alternative manages to avoid all the pitfalls o f the 
scheme-content dualism highlighted in OVICS. By putting the very idea of a 
conceptual scheme behind him, Davidson’s coherence theory of knowledge seems not 
(as is often claimed of coherence theories) to lose the world, but rather to offer it back 
to us by discarding the dogmatic Empiricism o f Quine and the Positivists. But, as is 
often the case in philosophy, things are not as rosy as they might seem.
Back to the Omniscient Interpreter.
Much o f what was claimed for Davidson’s coherence theoiy in the last few paragraphs 
rested heavily on the omniscient interpreter argument, and its conclusion that “it 
becomes impossible to hold that anyone could be mostly wrong about how things 
a r e ” .46 I  will now argue that while it may be impossible for a radical interpreter to 
hold that anyone could be mostly wrong about how things are, it does not follow that 
it is impossible for someone to be mostly wrong about how things are.
The reason, again, why it is impossible to hold that anyone could be in 
massive error is that all interpreters, no matter how much or little they know, must 
interpret using the Principle of Charity. Thus there is no interpreter that could 
interpret someone as having mostly false beliefs. Thus no one can make intelligible 
the possibility that someone is mostly wrong about things. But leaving the omniscient 
interpreter aside for a moment, let us consider how the fallible interpreter makes sure 
that those he interprets are mostly in agreement with him.
As we have seen (3.3), all the evidence available to the radical interpreter is 
what sentences the speaker holds true, and the goings on in the enviromnent inhabited
45Davidson, OVICS, p. 198.
46Davidson, “A Coherence Theory o f  Truth and Knowledge”, p. 317.
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by the speaker. The interpreter does not Icnow what the sentences held true by the 
speaker mean, nor does he know anything about the detailed contents o f the speaker’s 
beliefs. The process of interpretation involves investigation of conditions under 
which sentences are held true, and then mapping those sentences onto sentences in the 
home language which are held true under the same or similar circumstances. This last 
step is Davidson’s famous method of holding belief constant in order to solve for 
meaning (i.e. the Principle of Charity). My claim is that there is nothing in this 
method that will block the possibility of misinterpretation. Thus, while no interpreter 
can make sense o f there being someone with mostly false beliefs, this will not 
undermine the possibility that there are such people.
What allows an interpreter to take everyone as having mostly true beliefs by 
her lights is the fact that she is free to assign content to every speaker’s beliefs as she 
sees fit, as long as the assignment agrees with the evidence of holding true. But this 
constraint is no constraint at all. For the interpreter can impose any relation between 
beliefs and objects in the world that she chooses on the interpreter, and the evidence 
for radical interpretation will not show her to be wi'ong. To demonstrate, let us return 
to Kurt’s case.
Kurt is a German speaker who correctly takes ‘es regnet’ to mean ‘it is 
raining’. However, he believes it is raining only when it is not. The interpreter who 
comes across Kurt will attribute belief to him about when it is raining as follows. She 
will observe that Kurt holds ‘es regnet’ true when and only when it is not raining.
This she will take as evidence in support o f the T-sentence
(T) ‘es regnet’ is true-in-German if  and only if  it is not raining.
Generalising, the interpreter could go on to attribute to Kurt mostly true beliefs (by 
her lights), while Kurt is in fact massively in error about how the world is. What 
allows all interpreters to find unintelligible the possibility of mostly false belief is that 
there is nothing in the method o f interpretation that stops the interpreter mis- 
attributing beliefs to the speaker. If  this is so, then while it is the case that a radical 
interpreter cannot make sense o f the possibility o f someone having mostly false 
beliefs, this does not undermine the possibility of someone having mostly false 
beliefs.
In defence o f interpretation one might appeal to the community o f interpreters 
(as discussed above), and in the case o f Kurt, to our interpretations o f other German 
speakers, but to no avail. Once Kurt’s case is taken on board, it is no longer clear that 
interpreters share a common world containing the objects and events that make their 
sentences and beliefs true or false. Rather, it is possible that each interpreter holds to 
her own view o f what makes her sentences and beliefs true or false, and imposes this
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view on all others that she interprets. The sceptic will point out that she could of 
course be wrong, and even if  she is not, this does not ensure that other are not 
massively wrong. And the schemer will point out that on Davidson’s view o f things 
reality may no longer be relative to scheme, but it is now relative to belief and not 
vice versa. What there is depends on what we believe, rather than what we believe 
depending on what there is.
So, the omniscient interpreter argument is correct in its conclusion that “[o]nce 
we agree to the general method o f interpretation I have sketched, it becomes 
impossible correctly to hold that anyone could be mostly wrong about how things 
are.”47 However, the reason that Davidson’s general method of interpretation has 
such a epistemologically significant conclusion is because it sets such overly generous 
limits on what is to serve as correct attribution o f belief. Thus we discover, as 
Davidson did in his investigation o f conceptual relativism, that “as so often in 
philosophy, it is hard to improve intelligibility while retaining the excitement.”48
47/6/Z ,p . 317.
48Davidson, OVICS, p. 183.
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